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11 Introduction
1.1 Rwanda Crisis
Rwanda  is  a  small,  hilly  country  in  the  Great  Lakes  region  of  Central  Africa.  Before  the
events of 1994, it was the most densely populated country of the African continent. Rwanda
was and still is one of the poorest countries in the world. The majority of the population lives
on agriculture. The population was traditionally divided into the groups of Hutu, Tutsi and
Twa. The Hutu and the Tutsi make up the overwhelming majority.
The roots of the conflict between the Hutu and the Tutsi stretch back to colonial times, when
the  separation  of  the  groups  was  cemented.  The  Tutsis  were  favoured  by  the  colonisers,  as
they were considered more suitable to govern the country. The Tutsi dominance, however,
changed, when Rwanda gained independence and the Hutus took power.
The tension between the major groups culminated in the deadly campaign of the ruling Hutu
government. In 1994 approximately 800,000 people perished within 100 days. Even unborn
children were not spared. The aim was to eradicate the Tutsi population of Rwanda, so that
future generations would not know “what a Tutsi looked like”.
The international community failed to halt the genocide in Rwanda. It stood by idle, despite
alarming reports pouring into the United Nations headquarters in New York and into the
capitals of its member States. The governments of various States avoided calling the genocide
by its real name. The genocide was not stopped; the international community failed to follow
the infamous phrase “never again”, sworn after the Second World War.
Chapter 2 of the study examines the genocide in Rwanda as an historical incident. It
elaborates on the main stages, parties to, and scale of the conflict. Furthermore, it looks into
the role of the media in the genocide. The steps towards the establishment of the Rwanda
Tribunal are also discussed briefly. The explanation of the main facts of the conflict enables
the reader to understand the case law better, and, in addition, serves the purpose of
memorialising the tragedy.
21.2 The ICTR Case Law
The United Nations established the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (the ICTR or
the Tribunal) to bring to justice persons responsible for the genocide, following the blueprint
of its sister ad hoc tribunal for former Yugoslavia (the ICTY). The ICTR was empowered to
prosecute persons committing genocide as defined in its Statute. This definition uses exactly
the same wording as the Genocide Convention of 1948. The Security Council dusted the
decades-old provision on genocide, which had remained more or less dead letter since its
adoption, and blew life into it.
The Genocide Convention was adopted as a response to the horrors of the Holocaust in the
aftermath of the Second World War. The definition in the Convention is on the one hand a
description of the evil, which humanity is capable of, and on the other hand a criminalisation
of  genocide.  The  definition  is  rather  sparse  and  the  elements  of  the  crime are  not  specified
further in the Convention. Therefore, the provision has been under academic debate since its
adoption and needed an authoritative interpretation by an international judicial institution. The
ICTR was the first international judicial body to have the opportunity to interpret the
definition. In 1998 it rendered its first judgement and a conviction of genocide 50 years after
the adoption of the Genocide Convention.
The main interest of this study is the ICTR case law on the crime of genocide. The aim is to
discover how the Tribunal interprets the definition of genocide as contained in its Statute.
However, issues related to criminal participation of genocide are not dealt with.
The  last  part  of  the  study  starts  with  chapter  3  and  explores  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Tribunal
and the law applicable to the situation. The chapter sets the overall framework for inquiry into
the case law.
In chapter 4 the case law is examined in detail. The definition of genocide is divided into
elements, which are contemplated separately. First, the groups protected by the provision are
discussed (chapter 4.3). Second, the underlying offences (acts of genocide) are elaborated
(chapter 4.4). Last, the peculiar mental element of genocide is examined in the light of the
ICTR case law.
32 Rwanda Genocide and International Reaction
2.1 Historical Remarks
Rwanda has a lengthy colonial history. It was first the colony of Germany from the end of the
nineteenth century. In 1897 the Germans instituted a policy of indirect rule by enlisting Tutsi
chiefs to serve as their puppets and feudal lords to the Hutus. After the Germany’s defeat in
the First World War the Belgians took control of Rwanda. In 1933 the new rulers introduced
identity cards, which labelled every Rwandan as a Hutu, Tutsi, or Twa. The introduction of
this identity card that classified the people into one of the three ethnic groups enabled the
Belgians to administer an apartheid system in Rwanda, based on the precept of Tutsi
superiority. Tribal membership became increasingly rigid as a result of this formal
classification system.1 It may be said that the colonial powers planted the idea of racial
supremacy in the minds of the Rwandan people. However, this factor alone is not enough to
explain why the genocide unfolded. There were many factors that together made it possible
for genocide to take place.2
In 1959 Rwanda became independent from Belgium and the Hutus seized power from the
Tutsis. Following next years over 100,000 Tutsis fled to neighbouring countries to escape the
waves of mass killings. The exiled Tutsis established the Tutsi army, known as the Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF). The troops of the RPF invaded Rwanda from their bases located in
Uganda and repeatedly tried to overthrow the Rwandan government. They demanded an end
to Hutu tyranny and Tutsi exclusion. These attacks provoked revenge attacks targeted on the
Tutsis remaining in Rwanda.3
The RPF was able to gain ground in the northeast part of the country. In 1992 the Rwandan
government and the RPF began negotiating a series of agreements in Arusha, Tanzania. The
1 Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharft, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, vol. 1 (Transnational
Publishers, Inc.: Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, 1998), p. 49.
2 For more on this see Gérard Prunier, The Rwanda Crisis, History of a Genocide, 3rd impression (C. Hurst &
Company Ltd., London, 1998), chapter 1.
3 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p. 50.
4negotiations culminated in the signing of a comprehensive accord (Arusha Accord) in 1993.4
The Accord agreed on the integration of the armed forces, called for the ratification of
international human rights conventions, and for the deletion of references to ethnicity in
official documents.5 To monitor and implement the Accord the Security Council adopted
Resolution 872 on 5 October 1993 establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission for
Rwanda (UNAMIR).6 However,  the Arusha Accord was not implemented due to a series of
delays reportedly caused by President Habyarimana.7 This led to the deterioration of relations
between the government and the RPF.
2.2 The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda
2.2.1 The Downing of the Aeroplane Carrying the Rwandan President
On 6 April 1994 the downing of the plane carrying President Juvénal Habyarimana of
Rwanda and President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi led to a rapid escalation of violence.
The plane was shot down by a surface-to-air missile killing everybody on board.8
 The Hutu extremists instantly accused the RPF of assassinating President Habyarimana.
However, most probably the President was killed by members of his own inner circle
(“akazu”), who had decided to gamble on their all-or-nothing assassination scheme. The Hutu
extremists took this desperate act, because they began to fear that Habyarimana was finally
going to comply with the Arusha Accord.9
After the crash the Rwandan Presidential Guard immediately sealed off the area around Kigali
Airport from which the missile had been fired, preventing the United Nations peacekeeping
troops from investigating the cause of the plane crash.10
4 Letter from the Permanent Representative of the United Republic of Tanzania to the United Nations Addressed
to the Secretary-General, transmitting the Peace Agreement Signed at Arusha on 4 August 1993, U.N. Doc.
A/48/824-S/26915 (1993).
5 Paul J. Magnarella, Justice in Africa, Rwanda’s Genocide Its Courts, and the UN Criminal Tribunal (Ashgate
Publishing Ltd: Aldershot, 2000).
6 Security Council Resolution of the United Nations, S/RES/872 (1993), 5 October 1993, available at the United
Nations web site at http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions.html, last visited 5 April 2006.
7 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p. 51.
8 Ibid., p. 53.
9 Prunier, supra note 2, p. 221.
10 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p. 53-54.
5The killing of President Habyarimana on 6 April 1994 was the culmination of the long enmity
between the Hutus and the Tutsis. It was the trigger for the genocide in Rwanda. The
extremists made the fullest use of the crash in their propaganda to make the people believe
that the extermination of the Tutsis was a solution to the problems that plagued the country.
The roadblocks on the streets of Kigali were erected very rapidly after President
Habyarimana’s aeroplane was brought down at the Kigali airport. The plane was shot down at
around 8.30 p.m.; by 9.15 p.m. there were already roadblocks throughout the city and houses
were being searched.11 People’s identity cards were inspected and those who had a Tutsi
identity card or Tutsi  physical  traits  were summarily executed. In a few hours the streets of
Kigali began to fill with corpses.12
2.2.2 First Victims
The first victims were carefully selected. They were predominantly moderate Hutus. On 7
April 1994 members of the Presidential Guard went to the homes of the moderate opposition
members and murdered them and their families. One of the first victims was Prime Minister
Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was attacked in her house by an angry crowd. She was
supposed to be protected by ten Belgian UNAMIR soldiers, whom the Presidential Guard
officers demanded lay down their weapons. They obeyed and were taken to a military camp
and killed, whilst the Prime Minister was assassinated in her house. Her five children escaped
death through the courage of their neighbours.13
Among  the  first  victims  were  also  the  President  of  the  Constitutional  Court,  Joseph
Kavaruganda; numerous priests at the Christus Centre; businessman and civil rights activist
Charles Shamukiga; the leader of the democratic faction of the PL14, Landwald Ndasingwa
with  his  Canadian  wife  and  two  children;  the  leader  of  the  PSD15, Minister of Agriculture
Frédéric Nzamurambaho, along with his assistant Théoneste Gafaranga and several other
party members; journalist André Kamweya; former Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira;
and Information Minister Faustin Rocogoza. Furthermore, Prime Minister-designate Faustin
11 Prunier, supra note 2, p. 223, Interview by Prunier with Carlos Rodriguez, UNHCR delegate in Kigali on 15
May 1994.
12 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p. 54.
13 Prunier, supra note 2, p. 230.
14 Parti Libéral, the third largest opposition party.
15 Parti Social Démocrate, the second largest opposition party.
6Twagiramungu was to be killed, but the killers had the address slightly wrong - while they
were searching he had time to escape.16
Although the attacks were clearly focused on liberal politicians and other democrats, the
victims in the beginning of the conflict were not only well known people. The death lists
prepared were long, detailed and open to extension. Tutsis were killed simply because they
were Tutsis; they were considered to be accomplices of the RPF. Also Hutus who were either
members or simply sympathisers of democratic opposition parties were also killed. They were
considered no better than Tutsis, because of their opposition to “the democratic majority”.
People were also killed because of their high social status. Some well-dressed people, or
people who spoke good French, or people that owned a car and were not known to the
MRND(D)17 supporters were killed simply because these marks of social distinction made
them natural suspects for holding liberal opinions.18
2.2.3 Hate speeches on the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
In the course of the conflict the radio was efficiently used by the Hutu extremists to excite the
population and prepare and organise them for the killings. The masses were told to revenge
the death of President Habyarimana on the Tutsis and kill the accomplices of the RPF. Hate
speech against the Tutsis was the dominant state of affairs in Rwanda. People could do it
without any threat of responsibility.
Radio Rwanda remained neutral and confined itself to information bulletins, but the Radio
Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLMC) started to broadcast direct incitements to
murder Tutsis, “to avenge the death of our President”. Within the next few hours after the
crash the calls turned into hysterical appeals for ever-greater quantities of blood. The RTLMC
broadcasted such items as “You have missed some of the enemies in this or that place. Some
are still alive. You must go back there and finish them off.” or “The graves are not yet quite
full. Who is going to do the good work and help us fill them completely?”19
16 Prunier, supra note 2, pp. 230-231.
17 Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (et la Démocratie), Habyarimana’s single party,
its leader were among the main organisers of the genocide.
18 Prunier, supra note 2, p. 231.
19 Ibid., p. 224.
7The  role  of  the  RTLMC  was  of  great  importance  in  the  course  of  events.  Without  its
broadcasting of hate speech the killings would not have taken place so forcefully. It persuaded
people to kill their neighbours, with whom they had lived in peace, destroy their houses and
steal their cattle. Together with the orders and incitement from the leaders, it turned ordinary
people into cold-blooded killers, making them “collectively guilty of genocide”.
2.2.4 Parties to the Conflict
2.2.4.1 Three Categories of Individuals Responsible for the Genocide
The responsibility for the 1994 genocide in Rwanda is shared in varying degrees by three
categories of individuals: 1) the planners, 2) the “military” superiors and subordinates, and 3)
the unwilling accomplices. In the first category there are the high-level government officials
and other influential individuals, who planned the genocidal policies and ordered or otherwise
instigated the implementation of these polices. This group includes government politicians in
President Habyarimana’s MRND(D) party and the CDR20, as well as government
administrators at different levels.21
The second category of responsible individuals consists of those who supervised and executed
the actual killings. Members of the militia, the FAR22 and the Presidential Guard belong to
this group. Furthermore, the extent of the genocide would not have been possible without the
cooperation of local officials who helped in distributing weapons to the population, allowed
the curfew to be ignored by the killers, and rallied meetings in which they encouraged the
Hutus to kill the Tutsis and to destroy their homes.23
The third category of responsible individuals encompasses those who were forced to kill by
an individual from one or other of the two categories. It has been estimated that nearly half of
the Hutu population of Rwanda participated in the genocide.24
20 Coalition pour la Défense de la République, extremist party, one of the organisers of the genocide.
21 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p. 55.
22 Forces Armées Rwandais (Rwandan Armed Forces).
23 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p.57.
24 Ibid., p. 58.
82.2.4.2 Victims
The  great  majority  of  victims  of  the  conflict  were  people  that  belonged  to  the  Tutsi  social
group. All Tutsis were under threat of being slaughtered. No women, old people, children nor
even babies were spared. The hunting was called “bush clearing”, because of its absolute
thoroughness.25
The pattern of killing in the countryside differed from that of the towns, and even more in the
capital Kigali. In the countryside where people knew each other well, identifying the Tutsi
was easy and they therefore had absolutely no chance of escaping. The Hutu and the Tutsi
lived side by side in similar huts and, because of the demographic ratio, each Tutsi household
was usually surrounded by several Hutu families, making concealment almost impossible.26
In  towns  and  cities  the  situation  was  different,  since  people  did  not  know  each  other.  That
made the identification of the Tutsis harder. For that purpose roadblocks were erected where
people were asked for their identity cards. To be identified on one’s card as a Tutsi or to
pretend to have lost one’s papers meant unavoidable death. Even though a person carried a
Hutu card, he could be killed if he was suspected of being a supporter of the opposition
parties or was accused of having a false identification card due to having a Tutsi-like
appearance.27
2.2.4.3 Bystanders to the Conflict
The bystanders to the conflict were mostly the churches. Apart from some courageous acts of
ordinary Christians, the church hierarchies were at best useless and at worst accomplices in
the genocide. The aforementioned is especially true of the Catholic Church; however
Protestant Churches did not fare much better. 28
During the conflict Fathers Vleugels and Theunis of the White Fathers sent frequent faxes to
their  head  office  to  inform their  Order  of  the  developments  in  Rwanda.  The  general  tone  is
25 Prunier, supra note 2, p. 248-249.
26 Ibid., p. 249.
27 Ibid., p. 249.
28 Ibid., p. 250.
9very revealing. In the faxes there were precise lists of priests killed but nothing about the mass
killings of their parishioners. The violence is reported to be occurring but the perpetrators are
never identified. This ambiguous attitude of the Catholic Church towards the conflict can be
explained by the result of many years of close association between the republic of Rwanda
dominated by the Hutus and the Catholic Church.29
2.2.5 How Many Were Killed? – The Problem of Figures
The population of Rwanda is composed of three main groups. Two of the biggest groups are
Hutu  and  Tutsi.  The  smallest  group  is  called  Twa.  The  distinct  groups  share  the  same
language and culture. Therefore anthropologists have disagreed over whether the Hutu and the
Tutsi actually constitute different ethnicities.30
It quite impossible to measure with absolute precision how many were killed in the conflict
that started on 6 April and ended on 18 July 1994, i.e. from when the Hutu-dominated
Rwandan Government fled the country until the RPF established a new government of
national unity. The estimates of people who were slaughtered during the approximately 100
days of conflict range from half a million to one million civilians. That equates to fully
seventy-five per cent of Rwanda’s entire pre-genocide Tutsi population. Throughout this
period, the loss of life in Rwanda is estimated to have occurred at nearly three times the rate
of the loss of Jewish lives during the Holocaust.31
The estimates of the death toll fluctuated depending on the body giving them, but finally the
figures were settled roughly between half a million and one million. In the Final Report of the
Commission of Experts of 9 December 199432, the Commission adopted the estimate that
500,000 civilians were murdered in Rwanda.  According to a later report of the Independent
Inquiry33 the estimate is put at 800,000 dead.
29 Ibid., pp. 250-251.
30 Jaana Karhilo, The Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nordic Journal of
International Law, Vol. 64, No. 4 (1995), p. 684.
31 Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, p. 47.
32 Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 935 (1994),
U.N. Doc. S/1994/1405 (1994), par. 57, reprinted in Morris, Virginia & Scharft, Michael P., The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, vol. 2 (Transnational Publishers, Inc.: Irvington-on-Hudson, New York, 1998),
pp. 150-192.
33 Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda
of 15 December 1999, p. 3, U.N. Doc. S/1999/1257, the report is available at
http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/letters/1999/sglet.htm, last visited 5 April 2006.
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Prunier makes an illustrative calculation to assess the losses due to the conflict. He starts the
calculation from the August 1991 Rwandan census. Then he adds the yearly growth, about 3.2
per cent a year, of the population until 1994. He acknowledges that the Hutu dominated
government likely underestimated the Tutsi population in order to keep its schools and
employment quotas low. He takes cognizance of Tutsi population that survived the genocide
in foreign refugee camps and inside Rwanda. Prunier’s calculation results in a casualty figure
of 800,000 Tutsi killed in three months, to which must be added the deaths of opposition
Hutus – an unknown number but approximately between ten and thirty thousand. He
concludes with a total figure of between 800,000 and 850,000 casualties in the conflict. That
would mean a loss about 11 per cent of the pre-genocide population, one of the highest
casualty rates of any population in history from non-natural causes.34
2.3 Investigation  of  Human  Rights  Violations  –  First  Steps  towards  the
Tribunal
2.3.1 High Commissioner for Human Rights
On 4 May 1994, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr. José Ayala
Lasso, called attention to the worsening human rights situation in Rwanda. He called for the
convening of an emergency session of the Commission on Human Rights. The Commissioner
visited Rwanda on 11 and 12 May, and in a subsequent report called for immediate action to
stop the slaughter and urged the international community to condemn, in the strongest terms,
the “wanton killing” which had occurred.35 He also called the parties to the conflict to respect
all relevant human rights instruments, including the Genocide Convention of 194836, to which
Rwanda was a party. He also suggested that the Commission on Human Rights appoint a
Special Rapporteur for Rwanda.
The Commission on Human Rights subsequently convened the third special session in its
history in Geneva on 24 and 25 May 1994. The Commission condemned all breaches of
34 Prunier, supra note 2, p. 265.
35 Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on his mission to Rwanda on 11-12 May
1994, E/CN.4/S-3/3, 19 May 1994, reproduced in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, The United
Nations Blue Books Series, Vol. X (Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1996).
36 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277.
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international law and all violations and abuses of human rights in Rwanda. It endorsed the
High Commissioner’s recommendations concerning the appointment of a Special Rapporteur
assisted by a team of human rights officers.
2.3.2 Special Rapporteur for Rwanda
The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights René Degni Segui travelled to
Rwanda and neighbouring States between 9 and 20 June and again between 29 and 31 June.37
He described the killings as having been “planned, systematic and atrocious”, concluding that
a campaign of incitement to ethnic hatred and violence had been orchestrated by the public
authorities and the media belonging to the former government.
The Special Rapporteur determined that the vast majority of the massacres had been carried
out in areas held by the former government. Most of these massacres were conducted by
militia  aligned  to  MRND,  the interahamwe,  or  “those  who  attack  together”;  and  militia
affiliated with CDR, impuzamugambi, or “those who have a single aim”. In the media Tutsis
were referred to as the main enemy, the inyenzi, or “cockroach”, which had to be “crushed”.
Following his visits to the area, the Special Rapporteur determined that the conditions
specified by the Genocide Convention of 1948 had been found to exist and that the term
“genocide” was applicable to the killings of Tutsis. He called upon the United Nations to
establish an international tribunal to hear the evidence and bring the guilty parties to trial.
2.3.3 Commission of Experts
The international community had difficulty labelling what was happening in Rwanda
correctly. Especially, the members of the Security Council avoided using the term “genocide”
in its resolutions, perhaps fearing the consequences it would bring, i.e., responsibility to
prevent genocide in accordance with article VIII of the Genocide Convention. Finally, the
Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish, as a matter of urgency, an
37 Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights on the situation of human rights in
Rwanda, including summaries of his missions of 9-20 June, 29-31 June and 14-25 October 1994 and 27 March-3
April and 25-28 May 1995, A/50/709-S/1995/915, 2 November 1995, reproduced in The United Nations and
Rwanda 1993-1996, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol. X (Department of Public Information, United
Nations, New York, 1996).
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impartial Commission of Experts in Resolution 935 of 1 July 1994.38 The Commission was
mandated to review the evidence of grave violations of international law committed in
Rwanda, including possible acts of genocide.
The Commission of Experts visited Rwanda and neighbouring countries between 29 August
and 17 September 1994. The Commission then prepared a preliminary report39 of its findings.
It met with Government officials, interviewed refugees in Goma and Dar es Salaam. The
Commission was aided in its work by the information provided first of all by the Special
Rapporteur  and  secondly  by  the  Office  of  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for
Refugees. The Special Rapporteur produced a list containing 55 persons he considered chiefly
responsible for the massacres. They were individuals against whom there was sufficient
evidence regarding massive human rights violations. Also the Organization of African Unity,
non-governmental organisations and private individuals transmitted information containing
evidence relating to systematic killings and persecution.
In its final report40 of the Commission of Experts concluded that individuals from both sides
of the armed conflict had perpetrated serious breaches of international humanitarian law and
crimes against humanity. It concurred with the Special Rapporteur that there existed
“overwhelming evidence” indicating that the extermination of Tutsis by Hutu elements had
been planned months in advance of its actual execution. It had been carried out “in a
concerted, planned, systematic and methodical way” and had been motivated by ethnic hatred.
Furthermore, the Commission agreed with the Special Rapporteur that these mass
exterminations were clearly in violation of the Genocide Convention.
38 Security Council resolution requesting the Secretary-General to establish a Commission of Experts to examine
information on grave violations of international humanitarian law and possible acts of genocide in Rwanda,
S/RES/935 (1994), 1 July 1994, reproduced in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, The United Nations
Blue Books Series, Vol. X (Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1996).
39 Preliminary report of the Independent Commission of Experts established in accordance with Security Council
resolution 935 (1994), report is annexed to Letter dated 1 October 1994 from the Secretary-General to the
President of the Security Council transmitting the interim report of the Commission of Experts on the evidence
of grave violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda, including possible acts of genocide,
S/1994/1125, 4 October 1994, report and letter are reproduced in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996,
The United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol. X (Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York,
1996).
40 Final report of the Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 935 (1994),
report is annexed to Letter dated 9 December 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security
Council transmitting the final report of the Commission of Experts, S/1994/1405, 9 December 1994, report and
letter are reproduced in The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, The United Nations Blue Books Series, Vol.
X (Department of Public Information, United Nations, New York, 1996).
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The Commission strongly urged the Security Council to ensure that the individuals
responsible for human rights violations were brought to justice before an independent
international criminal tribunal. The Commission recommended that the Security Council
amend the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia to extend
its jurisdiction over crimes under international law to those committed during the armed
conflict in Rwanda, which had begun on 6 April 1994.
3 Jurisdiction of the Tribunal and Applicable Law
3.1 Resolution 955 of 1994
The Security Council went ahead with its preparations for establishing an international
institution to investigate and prosecute individuals responsible for grave violations of
international humanitarian law and acts of genocide. It did not, however, fully follow the
recommendations made by the Commission of Experts. The Commission had recommended
that the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia should
be expanded to cover international crimes committed in Rwanda rather than to create a
separate ad hoc international criminal tribunal.
On 8 November 1994 the Security Council adopted the Resolution 955 establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.41 The Resolution was adopted under chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations and it is binding on all member states of the United
Nations pursuant to article 25 of the Charter.
The Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal (the ICTR Statute)42 is annexed to the Resolution 955.
When  the  Statute  of  the  Rwanda  Tribunal  was  under  preparation,  the  Statute  of  the
International  Criminal  Tribunal  for  the  former  Yugoslavia  (the  ICTY Statute)43 provided an
41 Security Council resolution establishing an International Tribunal to prosecute those responsible for genocide
and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in Rwanda between 1 January and 31
December 1994, S/RES/955 (1994), 8 November 1994.
42 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and Other
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring State,
between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
43 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, annexed to
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acceptable blueprint. Therefore, the foregoing statutes are alike in many respects: articles on
genocide44 are, nevertheless, identical. The Tribunals share a common Appeals Chamber45 to
guarantee  uniform  application  of  law.  They  also  had  a  common  Prosecutor  until  the  ICTR
Statute was amended in that respect.46 The Security Council appointed Mr. Hassan Bubacar
Jallow of The Gambia as the prosecutor of the Rwanda Tribunal, succeeding Mrs. Carla Del
Ponte of Switzerland. The amendment took effect on 15 September 2003.47
3.1.1 Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
3.1.1.1 Limited Jurisdiction
The competence of the Rwanda Tribunal is limited in many respects. In general it is restricted
to the historical events that took place in Rwanda in 1994. It also has limited competence in
the purpose for which it was established. The Tribunal was established by the Security
Council “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and
Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the
territory of neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994”.48 Article 1
of the ICTR Statute confers upon the Tribunal the power to prosecute persons responsible for
such crimes in accordance with the provisions of the Statute.  It defines the jurisdiction in
general terms in accordance with this limited purpose and further indicates that this
jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance with its constituent instrument.
The  jurisdiction  is  further  elaborated  in  later  provisions  of  the  ICTR  Statute.  Here  are
mentioned  only  a  few aspects  of  the  jurisdiction.  The  emphasis  is  put  on  the  subject  matter
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, especially the crime of genocide that is discussed in the following
chapter.
Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art. 4, U.N.
Doc. S/25704 (1993). The Statute is available at http://www.un.org/icty/index.html, last visited 5 April 2006.
44 Article 2 in the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal and article 4 in the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal.
45 Article 13(4) of the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal.
46 Security Council resolution 1503, S/RES/1503 (2003), 28 August 2003, the resolutions are available on the
web site of the UN Documentation Centre at http://www.un.org/documents/index.html, last visited 5 April 2006.
47 Security Council resolution 1505, S/RES/1505 (2003), 4 September 2003.
48 Resolution 955, para. 1.
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The Tribunal has personal jurisdiction over natural persons only.49 This jurisdiction does not
extend to legal or juridical persons. That means that corporations, organisations with
necessary legal personality and states may not be prosecuted in front of the Tribunal.
The territorial jurisdiction of the Tribunal is limited to the territory of Rwanda as well as to
the  territory  of  neighbouring  states.  However,  only  Rwandan citizens  can  be  prosecuted  for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in neighbouring states. The
temporal jurisdiction, on the other hand, only covers the period beginning on 1 January 1994
and ending 31 December 1994.50 From this follows that crimes committed before or after that
period cannot be prosecuted in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal has concurrent jurisdiction with national courts to prosecute persons for serious
violations of international humanitarian law. This is to do with the peculiar characteristics of
crimes under international law. In principle, all states have competence to prosecute and
punish the perpetrators of such crimes. The Tribunal has, however, primacy over national
courts and therefore may at any stage of the procedure formally request a national court to
defer to its competence.51
3.1.1.2 Subject Matter Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of the Rwanda Tribunal covers offences that are stated in
articles  2,  3  and  4  of  the  ICTR  Statute.  It  has  jurisdiction ratione materiae over genocide,
crimes against humanity and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and
of  Additional  Protocol  II  to  the  preceding  Convention.  In  this  study  the  crimes  against
humanity and violations of article 3 common to the Geneva Convention and of Additional
Protocol II are not discussed further.
49 Article 7 of the ICTR Statute.
50 Article 7 of the ICTR Statute.
51 Article 8 of the ICTR Statute.
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Article 2 of the Statute of the Rwanda Tribunal is as follows:
Article 2: Genocide
1.      The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have the power to prosecute persons committing genocide as
defined in paragraph 2 of this Article or of committing any of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this
Article.
2.      Genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a)     Killing members of the group;
(b)     Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c)     Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(d)     Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e)     Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
3.      The following acts shall be punishable:
(a)     Genocide;
(b)     Conspiracy to commit genocide;
(c)     Direct and public incitement to commit genocide;
(d)     Attempt to commit genocide;
(e)     Complicity in genocide.
In the Statute genocide is the first category of crimes over which the Rwanda Tribunal has
subject matter jurisdiction. The provision is based on relevant articles of the Genocide
Convention of 194852 and is identical to the formulation in the ICTY Statute.
Article 2(1) of the ICTR Statute empowers the Tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for
the crime of genocide. Article 2(2) of the Statute is the most important part of the provision
on genocide, because it contains the material description of genocide. It enumerates groups
that are protected by the article and lists the acts by which genocide can be committed.
Further, it sets a requirement that acts must be committed with the intent to destroy a group.
52 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the General Assembly of
the United Nations on Dec. 9, 1948, 78 UNTS 277.
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3.2 International Criminal Law
International criminal law is a branch of public international law and therefore the rules
making up this body originate from sources of international law. It is, however, relatively new
branch of law compared to traditional public international law.
One of the characteristics of international criminal law is that it simultaneously derives its
origin, additionally, from human rights law and from national criminal law, more than any
other segment of international law. It is an essentially hybrid branch of law. It can be
described as being public international law impregnated with notions, principles, and legal
constructs derived from national criminal and human rights law. However, the recent
establishment of international criminal tribunals, and in particular of the International
Criminal Court (the ICC), has given impulse to the evolution of a corpus of international
criminal  rules  proper.  This  development  seems  to  have  opened  the  path  to  formation  of  a
fully-fledged body of law in this area.53
The most authoritative provision on the sources of international law can be found in article 38
of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. It stipulates that primary sources are
treaties and international customary law, as well as, general principles of law. The subsidiary
sources are judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists.
The sources may be utilised in the order described in the following. One should first of all
look for treaty rules or for rules laid down in such international instruments as binding
resolutions  of  the  Security  Council  of  the  United  Nations,  when  these  treaty  rules  or
resolutions contain provisions conferring jurisdiction on the court or tribunal and setting out
the procedure. Where such rules are lacking or contain gaps, one should resort to customary
law or to treaties implicitly or explicitly referred to in the aforementioned rules. When even
this  set  of  general  or  treaty  rules  is  of  no  avail,  one  should  apply  general  principles  of
international criminal law or, as a fallback, general principles of law. If one still does not find
the applicable rule, one may finally have to resort to general principles of criminal law
53 Cassese, Antonio, International Criminal Law, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), pp. 18-19.
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common to the nations of the world. Nowadays the order described above is by and large
codified in article 21 of the Statute of the International Criminal Court.54
The ICTR Statute lacks a general article on applicable law. As an international judicial body
the Rwanda Tribunal must apply in the first instance, international law: its Statute and the
Genocide Convention. In the second, it may resort to other sources of law, if international
instruments are of no avail when discussing a specific issue. For interpreting the ICTR Statute
one may rely upon the rules of interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties.55 Indeed, in many respects the resolution and the annexed Statute may be equated
with international treaties. However, one must also stay mindful of the general principles of
criminal law, such as, the principle of legality of crimes (nullum crimen sine lege), and the
principle of legality of penalties (nulla poena sine lege).
3.3 Genocide in International Law
3.3.1 Concept of Genocide
The  concept  of  the  crime  of  genocide  is  relatively  new  and  developed  primarily  in  the
aftermath of the Nazi atrocities committed during the Second World War. It was first
envisaged merely as a sub-category of crimes against humanity during the Nuremberg
Trials.56 Neither article 6(c) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT) nor
article II(1)(c) of Control Council Law no. 10 explicitly envisaged genocide as a separate
category of these crimes. However, the wording of the relevant provisions clearly shows that
those crimes encompassed genocide.57
54 Ibid., p. 26.
55 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna 22 May 1969, entry into force on 27 January 1980, United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, art. 31, 32 and 33. The text of the convention is available at
http://www.un.org/law/ilc/, last visited 5 April 2006.
56 The article 6(c) of the Charter of International Military Tribunal stipulates: “CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any
civilian population, before or during the war, or persecution on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation
of domestic law of the country where perpetrated.”, Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major
War Criminals of the European Axis, and Establishing the Charter of the International Military Tribunal (IMT),
signed 8 August 1945, (1951) 82 UNTS 279. Original signatories: the United States of America, France, the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union.
57 Cassese, supra note 53, p. 96.
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 The term of genocide has its origins in the work of Polish attorney and scholar Raphael
Lemkin. He was a primary proponent of an international convention on the subject. In his
1944 study survey into Nazi occupation policies, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe58, he
proposed that the term genocide should be employed to describe “the destruction of a nation
or of an ethnic group”. The neologism of genocide combined the ancient Greek word genos
(race, tribe) and the Latin cide (killing), thus paralleling such words as tyrannicide, homicide
and infanticide.
Genocide acquired autonomous significance as a specific crime in 1948, when the General
Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Genocide Convention. Nowadays 133 states are
parties to the Convention.59
3.3.2 Definition of Genocide
The definition of genocide contained in article 2 of the ICTR Statute60 is based on articles II
and III of the Genocide Convention of 1948. In the Reservations to the Genocide Convention
case61 the International Court of Justice stated that: “The principles underlying the
Convention are recognised by civilised nations as binding on States even without any
conventional obligation.” The Court thus recognised the definition as customary international
law. This position was recalled by the United Nation’s Secretary-General in his Report on the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.62
The crime of genocide is comprised of three main elements: 1) the commission of at least one
of the acts listed in Article 2(2) (a) through (e); 2) the act must be directed against one of the
enumerated types of groups; and 3) the act must be carried out with the intent to destroy the
group,  in  whole  or  in  part.63 The  first  element  is  the  objective  element  or actus reus of the
58 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: Washington,
1944), cited in Matthew Lippman, Genocide in: International Criminal Law, M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), Volume
I (Transnational Publishers: New York, 1999), p. 590.
59 Status of ratifications as of 9 October 2001, Web site of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights http://www.unhchr.ch/, last visited 5 April 2006.
60 See the citation of article 2 above.
61 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1951 I.C.J 23
(Advisory Opinion).
62 Secretary General’s Report pursuant to paragraph 2 of resolution 808 (1993) of the Security Council, 3 May
1993, S/25704.
63 Steven R. Ratner, Accountability for Human Rights Atrocities in International Law, Beyond the Nuremberg
Legacy, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2001), p. 29.
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crime. The second and the third element are part the subjective element or mens rea of the
crime. In this study the protected groups are examined separately in chapter 4.3 below, for
analytical reasons.
4 The Crime of Genocide in the Case Law of the Tribunal
4.1 Introduction
The trials before the Rwanda Tribunal are composed of pre-trial proceedings, trial
proceedings and post-trial proceedings. Virtually all cases go through all the phases
mentioned, and therefore the processes take several years to be concluded. Before a trial
begins the Office of the Prosecutor performs the investigation of an alleged crime and
prepares an indictment to be reviewed and confirmed by a Judge of the Trial Chamber. The
presence of an accused is secured by an order to arrest and transfer of the accused, which the
States are obliged to obey.
The pre-trial proceedings include, e.g., the initial appearance of an accused and appointment
or assignment of defence a counsel. The Trial Chamber may issue such pre-trial orders as may
be required for the conduct of a trial. Both parties may file various motions requesting any
ruling or other relief that may be appropriate before the actual commencement of a trial or file
restrictedly interlocutory appeals with the Chamber.
The trial proceedings are public trials where the case is presented, evidence produced and
witness testimonies given. A third party may participate as amicus curiae by submitting its
views in writing or by appearing before the Trial Chamber. A State, an organisation or an
individual may participate upon request or by invitation if the Trial Chamber considers that
this would to a proper determination of the case.
At the post-trial stage the Trial Chamber judgements can be appealed to or reviewed by the
Appeals Chamber in accordance with articles 24 and 25 respectively. Article 24 requires that
an  appeal  must  pertain  to  an  error  of  law which  invalidates  the  decision  or  an  error  of  fact
which has occasioned a miscarriage of justice. Article 25, on the other hand, stipulates that a
new fact must have been discovered which was not known at the time of proceedings before
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the Trial Chamber or the Appeals Chamber, and which could have been a decisive factor in
reaching the decision.64
Thus far the trials of 26 accused persons have been completed since the establishment of the
Rwanda Tribunal in 1994.65 All the indictments have contained charges of genocide, or of
other modalities of genocide, e.g., complicity in genocide. In the trials the Tribunal has found
23 of those accused guilty and acquitted three persons; the indictment was withdrawn in two
cases. Altogether the Tribunal has rendered 20 trial judgements.
The Appeals Chamber has handed down 12 judgements concerning 14 accused persons. It has
affirmed the verdicts and sentences with minor changes. In addition, it has entered two war
crimes convictions for the first time in the history of the Rwanda Tribunal.66 Only  two
convictions have not been appealed against.67 Furthermore, today there are eight appeals
pending before the Appeals Chamber, 28 detainees on trial and 15 awaiting trial before the
Tribunal.
In this study thorough attention is paid to the cases in which the Appeals Chamber has
delivered its final judgement. However, some remarks are made to other cases of the Rwanda
Tribunal as well and to cases before the Yugoslavia Tribunal and other relevant bodies, when
appropriate.
In the next chapter, before entering the case law, the leading case on genocide of the ICTR is
presented. This case provides an example of the process in the Tribunal and is elaborated due
to its significance as the first international judgement on genocide after the adoption of the
Genocide Convention.
64 For more information on the proceedings see Morris & Scharft, supra note 1, chapters XI, XII and XIII.
65 The information on the trials and judgements is mainly obtained from the ICTR web site at
http://www.ictr.org/, last visited 5 April 2006.
66 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-3, 26 May 2003.
67 Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-97-32-I, 1 June 2000, a Belgian national
got a sentence of 12 years in prison and Prosecutor v. Rutaganira, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No.
ICTR-951C-I, 14 March 2005.
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4.2 Akayesu Trial
On 2 September 1998 the Rwanda Tribunal delivered its first judgement dealing with the
crime of genocide in the case Prosecutor v. Akayesu68. The ICTR was the first international
court to endeavour to interpret the definition of genocide and finding an individual
responsible for acts of genocide. The judgement was rendered exactly fifty years after the
adoption of the Genocide Convention. This leading judgement’s “primordial achievement”69
is its conclusion that genocide, as defined in Article 2 of the ICTR Statute and Articles II and
III of the Genocide Convention, in fact occurred during the months of April, May, and June
1994. The Trial Chamber I composed of Laïty Kama, presiding, and Judges Lennart Aspegren
and Navanethem Pillay rendered the lengthy decision70 that exhaustively analyses the facts in
the case, and presents a discussion of many of the legal issues, including the definition of
genocide, the nature of command responsibility and the threshold for non-international armed
conflict.
The accused Jean-Paul Akayesu, born in 1953, served as the “bourgmestre” (mayor) of Taba
commune from April 1993 until June 1994. Prior to his appointment as bourgmestre, he was a
teacher and school inspector in Taba.71 He was arrested in Zambia on 10 October 1995. On 22
November 1995, the Prosecutor requested the Zambian authorities keep him in detention for a
period of 90 days, while awaiting the completion of the investigation.72
The Prosecutor Richard Goldstone submitted the initial indictment on 13 February 1996,
which was amended on 17 June 1997 during the trial with leave from the Chamber. The
Amended Indictment contains a total of 15 counts covering genocide, crimes against
humanity and violations of article 3 Common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
Additional Protocol II of 1977 thereto. More specifically on counts of genocide, Akayesu was
68 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 September 1998 (Akayesu Judgement).
69 Commentary of William Schabas in: Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals,  The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 1994-1999, André Klip and Göran Sluiter (eds.), Volume II
(Intersentia: Antwerp, 2001) (Schabas commentary), p. 539.
70 The Judgement has 744 paragraphs and almost 100,000 words.
71 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Amended Indictment, Case No. ICTR-96-4-I, para. 3.
72 Akayesu Judgement, para. 9.
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individually charged with genocide, complicity in genocide and direct and public incitement
to commit genocide.73
The Indictment was confirmed and an arrest warrant was issued by Judge William H. Sekule
on 16 February 1996. Akayesu was transferred from Zambia to the Detention Facilities of the
Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania, on 25 May 1996. The initial appearance of the accused before
the Court took place on 30 May 1996, where he pleaded not guilty to all the counts against
him.74 The trial on the merits opened on 9 January 1997.75 In  the  course  of  the  trial  the
prosecutor  called  28  witnesses  and  the  defence  13  witnesses  to  the  stand,  including  the
accused. A total of 155 exhibits were submitted to the Tribunal.76 On 26 March 1998 the case
was adjourned for deliberation on the judgement after 60 days of hearings.77
The Trial Chamber I unanimously found Akayesu guilty of, inter alia, genocide and direct
and public incitement to commit genocide, but not guilty of complicity in genocide78 and
sentenced him a month later in a separate decision to life imprisonment.79 The Chamber found
that Akayesu, from 18 April 1994 onwards, had participated actively and enthusiastically in
the massacres, tolerating, ordering, and, in some cases, personally engaging in killings,
beatings and rapes.
Both the prosecutor and the defence appealed the verdict to the Appeals Chamber. The
Appeals Chamber unanimously dismissed each of the grounds of appeal raised by Akayesu
and affirmed the verdict of guilty and the sentence of life imprisonment on 1 June 2001. The
grounds of appeal raised by the Prosecution addressed alleged errors of law by the Trial
Chamber, which fell outside the scope of article 24 of the ICTR Statute. The Prosecution
acknowledged that its grounds of appeal would have no bearing on the Trial Chamber's
judgement, but argued that they were nonetheless "important matters of general significance
to the Tribunal’s jurisprudence."80 The Appeals Chamber agreed with the Prosecutor and
73 Ibid., para. 10.
74 Ibid., paras. 11 and 12.
75 Ibid., para. 17.
76 Ibid., para. 24.
77 Ibid., para. 28.
78 Ibid.,  chapter 8. Verdict.
79 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 October 1998.
80 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-A, 1 June 2001, para. 14.
24
continued ruling on the grounds raised by the Prosecutor, however, with Judge Nieto-Navia
dissenting.81
This first case was a massive task and challenge for the Tribunal facing many serious
operational deficiencies in the management of the Tribunal. According to the Report of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services, in the Tribunal's Registry not a single administrative
area functioned effectively, the Office of the Prosecutor in Kigali had administrative,
leadership and operational problems and the relationship between the Registry and the Office
of the Prosecutor was often characterised by tension rather than cooperation.82 Nonetheless,
despite being still in the phase of formation when the initial appearance of Akayesu took place
in May 1996, the Trial Chamber managed to steer the case to a conclusion that took more than
two and half years to be made.
4.3 Protected Groups
The protected groups enumerated in article 2 of the ICTR Statute, based on article II of the
Genocide  Convention,  are  national,  ethnical,  racial  or  religious  groups.  This  part  of  the
formulation of the definition of genocide has been one of the most controversial besides the
intent  requirement  for  genocide.  It  has  been  described  as  far  too  restrictive  to  allow  the
Convention to function appropriately, for example by excluding political, linguistic,
ideological,  and  economic  groups  from  protection.  For  several  decades  the  Genocide
Convention was the only international legal instrument enjoying widespread ratification that
imposed meaningful obligations upon states in cases of mass atrocities. People in despair
turned to the Convention in the hopes for relief. This situation made many academics and
human  rights  activists  to  call  for  its  amendment,  to  make  it  more  readily  applicable  and  to
suggest rather more expansive interpretations of its terms. The tendency was to focus on what
are widely perceived as the shortcomings of the Convention.
81 Ibid., paras. 27 and 28.
82 Report of the Office of Internal Oversight Services on the audit and investigation of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, United Nations, General Assembly, UN Doc., A/51/789, 6 February 1997.
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As an example that “illustrates the critical shortfall of the Genocide Convention”83 is
frequently mentioned the killing in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge era in 1975–78. Under
the repressive rule it is estimated that almost a fifth of the population was executed or killed
by being worked or starved to death.
Beth Van Schaack strongly argues that political groups are indeed protected by the broader
jus cogens prohibition of genocide.  The Genocide Convention is not the sole authority on the
crime of genocide, but rather a higher law exists. The scholar proposes that the prohibition of
genocide represents the paradigmatic jus cogens norm, a customary and peremptory norm of
international law from which no derogation is permitted. This prohibition is broader than the
Convention’s prohibition and the attempts of the drafters of the Convention to exclude
political groups from article II of the Convention is without legal force to the extent that it is
inconsistent with the jus cogens prohibition of genocide. The scholar goes on suggesting that
in the event of mass killings evidencing the intent to eradicate political groups in whole or in
part, domestic and international judicatory bodies should apply the jus cogens prohibition of
genocide.84 This position has not, however, received wholehearted support from other
researchers.
According to Raphael Lemkin, the developer of the term of genocide, “by genocide we mean
the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group”. He called for the development of
“provisions protecting minority groups from oppression because of their nationhood, religion,
or race”. Lemkin’s writings indicate he conceived of the repression of genocide within the
context  of  the  protection  of  what  were  then  called  “national  minorities”.  The  terms  such  as
“ethnic”, “racial” or “religious” were merely used to flesh out the idea, without at all changing
its essential content.85
In practice there are essentially two ways of determining who is a member of a group. First,
objective criteria can be applied. Second, membership of a group can be decided on the basis
of subjective identification, either by the victims themselves or by the perpetrator of the
83 Beth Van Schaack, The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide Convention’s Blind Spot, The
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 106:2259 (1997), p. 2261.
84 Ibid., pp. 2261-2262.
85 William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law, The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 2000), p. 104-105. Schabas citing Lemkin’s 1944 book Axis Rule in Occupied Europe.
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crime.86 Taking an objective approach involves defining the group and then assessing whether
the victims belong to it. A subjective standpoint, on the other hand, is unconcerned with
whether the group really exists in an objective sense. Its analysis involves assessing the views
and intentions of the perpetrator or of the group member.
In Akayesu the Trial Chamber I largely followed the precedents87 of the Permanent Court of
International Justice (PCIJ) and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which had both opted
for objective criteria. The Trial Chamber’s reluctance to determine membership of a group on
subjective criteria can also derive from criminal law, because mistakes of fact can often be
determinative of the qualification of the crime. As a starting point it perceived that the
Genocide Convention affords protection to “stable” groups, i.e., groups constituted in a
permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth rather than to “mobile”
groups, i.e., groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as
political and economic groups.  The Chamber stated that the four groups protected by the
convention share a “common criterion,” namely, “that membership in such groups would
seem to be normally not challengeable by its members, who belong to it automatically, by
birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.” 88
 In Kayishema & Ruzindana a trial chamber sitting in a different composition89 adopted  a
more subjective approach, noting that an ethnic group could be “a group which distinguishes
itself, as such (self identification); or, a group identified as such by others, including
perpetrators of the crimes (identification by others)”.90 It concluded in legal findings that the
Tutsis were an ethnic group based on the existence of government-issued official identity
cards describing them as such.91 The ICTY has taken the same approach in Jelisic in its first
judgement on a genocide indictment. However, the Trial Chamber also conceded that the
86 Guglielmo Verdirame, The Genocide Definition in the Jurisprudence of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, International
and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 49 (July 2000), p. 588.
87 Rights of Minorities in Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), P.C.I.J. Rep. Series A, No.12 and Nottebohm
(Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) (Merits) [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4. The summary of the Nottebohm case can be obtained
from the web site of the International Court of Justice at http://www.icj-cij.org/, last visited 5 April 2006.
88 Akayesu Judgement, para. 511.
89 Judge William H. Sekule, presiding, Judges Yakov A. Ostrovsky and Tafazzal Hossain Khan.
90 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-T, 21 May 1999 (Kayishema
and Ruzindana Judgement), para. 98.
91 Ibid., para. 523.
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intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention was to assess groups on an objective rather
than a subjective basis.92
In Rutaganda93and Musema94 the Trial Chamber I sitting in the same composition as in the
Akayesu trial seems to move away from its original, rather strict, objective approach,
acknowledging that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial and religious groups have been
researched extensively and, at present, there are no generally and internationally accepted
precise definitions thereof.  According to the Chamber the concepts must be assessed in the
light of a particular political, social and cultural context. It went on to state that for the
purposes of applying the Genocide Convention, membership of a group is, in essence, a
subjective rather than an objective concept. The victim is perceived by the perpetrator of
genocide as belonging to a group slated for destruction (identification by others). In some
instances, the victim may perceive himself or herself as a member of said group (self
identification). This seems to be quite different from the approach to defining group
membership taken a few years earlier.
The objective and subjective approaches should not be seen as rivals to each other. The pure
subjective approach is appealing up to a point, especially because the perpetrator’s intent is a
decisive element in the crime of genocide. Its flaw is in allowing, at least in theory, genocide
to be committed against a group that does not have any real objective existence. Although
helpful to an extent, the subjective approach flounders, because law cannot permit the crime
to be defined by the offender alone. It is necessary, therefore, to determine some objective
existence of the four groups.95 In Bagilishema the  Trial  Chamber  I  sitting  in  a  renewed
composition appears to attempt to reconcile both the objective and the subjective approach,
stating that:
The Chamber notes that the concepts of national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups enjoy no generally or
internationally accepted definition.[62] Each of these concepts must be assessed in the light of a particular
political, social, historical, and cultural context. Although membership of the targeted group must be an objective
feature  of  the  society  in  question,  there  is  also  a  subjective  dimension.[63]  A  group  may  not  have  precisely
92 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-10-T, 14 December 1999 (Jelisic Judgement), paras.
69-72.
93 Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-3-T, 6 December 1999
(Rutaganda Judgement), paras. 55-57.
94 Prosecutor v. Musema, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A, 27 January 2000 (Musema
Judgement), paras. 160-163.
95 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 110.
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defined boundaries and there may be occasions when it is difficult to give a definitive answer as to whether or
not a victim was a member of a protected group. Moreover, the perpetrators of genocide may characterize the
targeted  group in  ways  that  do  not  fully  correspond to  conceptions  of  the  group shared  generally,  or  by  other
segments  of  society.  In  such  a  case,  the  Chamber  is  of  the  opinion  that,  on  the  evidence,  if  a  victim  was
perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group, the victim could be considered by the Chamber as a
member of the protected group, for the purposes of genocide.96
The application of the four groups to the Rwandan situation was not without difficulties.
Historically, it is believed that the Rwandan Tutsis are descendants of Nilotic herders,
whereas the Rwandan Hutus are considered to be of Bantu origin from south and central
Africa. Their economies were different, the Tutsis raising cattle while the Hutus tilled the soil.
There are genomic differences, a typical Tutsi being tall and slender, with a fine, pointed
nose, a typical Hutu being shorter with a flatter nose. These differences are visible in some,
but not in many others. Tutsis, although commonly described as an ethnic group, do not share
a language, religion or a culture distinct that of the Hutus. Both speak Kinyarwanda, a Bantu
language, and there is no difference in the customary practices of the two groups. Mixed
marriages are common.97
The division of the Hutu and the Tutsi was enforced by the colonial rulers. First, under
German rule between 1888 and 1916, and then from 1919 onwards under Belgian rule.98 Both
the  German  and  Belgian  authorities  relied  on  an  elite  essentially  composed  of  people  who
referred to themselves as Tutsi, a choice which according to the testimony of Dr. Alison
Desforges was born of racial or even racist considerations. The colonisers thought that the
Tutsi looked more like them, because of their height and colour, and were therefore more
intelligent and better equipped to govern.99
Eventually, the division between the groups of Hutu, Tutsi and Twa was cemented by the
Belgian authorities, which introduced a permanent distinction by dividing the population into
three groups termed ethnic groups. In line with this division, it became mandatory for every
Rwandan to carry an identity card mentioning his or her ethnicity. The reference to ethnic
96 Prosecutor v. Bagilishema, Trial Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1A-T, 7 June 2001 (Bagilishema Judgement),
para. 65. Composition of the Chamber: Judge Erik Møse, Presiding, Judges Asoka de Zoysa  Gunawardana and
Mehmet Güney.
97 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 109.
98 WSOY Pikkuj@ttiläinen, Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, 2004 (Finnish encyclopaedia on the Internet).
99 Akayesu Judgement, para. 82.
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background on identity cards was maintained even after Rwanda’s independence and was
finally abolished only after the genocide.100
The four terms of ‘national’, ‘ethnical’, ‘racial’ and ‘religious’ groups are analysed separately
below. Especially, the leading Akayesu judgement, which first attempted to define the
boundaries of the four groups, is examined. The judgement’s dictum is, however, rather short
and uses simple words.
4.3.1 National Group
In international law the word ‘national’ has had two implications. It has been understood to
mean ‘national’ in the sociological sense and in the political sense, or respectively the
sociological ‘nation’ and ‘national’ as citizen. Both positions have been defended in the
literature and in the practice of States. C.A. Macartney argues that the word national should
be understood to mean “the feeling of appurtenance to a nation, [which] is fundamentally
different from nationality in the sense of membership of a state”.101 The opposite opinions
have been expressed by G. Gilbert, N. Lerner, and G. Pentassuglia who interpret the word to
mean citizen, the position endorsed by several UN Rapporteurs who were appointed to study
the question of minorities.102
The question of nationality raised an exchange of thoughts during the 1950s when the draft
provisions of the Covenant on Civil  and Political  Rights103 were debated. The Soviet Union
began rallying States behind its draft resolution obliging states to “ensure to national
minorities the right to possess their national schools, libraries, museums… ”104 At that time, it
was heatedly opposed to the idea of promoting the rights of persons who belonged to ethnic,
linguistic or religious minorities, because “a group could be called an ethnic or linguistic
group  long  before  it  had  reached  the  stage  of  becoming  a  national  minority”.105  When the
100 Ibid., para. 83.
101 Cited in Eyassu Gayim, The Concept of Minority in International Law: A Critical Study of the Vital Elements,
Juridica Lapponica No. 27, Publications Series of the Northern Institute for Environmental and Minority Law
(University of Lapland Press: Rovaniemi, 2001), p. 74.
102 Ibid.
103 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR), adopted and opened for signature,
ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force
23 March 1976, in accordance with Article 49. The text of the Covenant can be obtained from the web site of the
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/, last visited 5 April 2006.
104 Cited in Gayim, supra note 101, p. 75.
105 Ibid.
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Soviet Union was asked to clarify its conception of national minority it responded by pointing
out that this expression was derived from the concept of the sociological nation, i.e.:
an historically formed community of people characterized by a common language, a common territory, a
common economic life and a common psychological structure manifesting itself a common culture.
Consequently, a ‘national minority’ meant a group with the same characteristics.106
That is to say, when the socialists used the word ‘national’ what they had in mind was not
necessary ‘citizens’. The Soviet draft was, however, rejected for various reasons and,
eventually, the provision107 that was adopted provided protection for the rights of persons
belonging to ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities.
On the other hand, the conviction of most of the European States is strongly that ‘national’
means ‘having citizenship’. Even the pertinent provisions of many of the European regional
instruments108 dealing with minority rights use the expression ‘national minorities’, and the
term is widely understood to apply to persons ‘having citizenship’.
 The  ICTR,  when  for  the  first  time  dealing  with  the  question  of  nationality  in Akayesu,
resorted to the Nottebohm case of the ICJ. In the case the ICJ stated that:
Nationality is a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine connection of existence,
interests and sentiments, together with the existence of reciprocal rights and duties. It may be said to constitute
the juridical expression of the fact that the individual upon whom it is conferred, either directly by the law or as a
result of an act of the authorities, is in fact more closely connected with the population of the State conferring
nationality than with that of any other State.109
The ICJ considered nationality to be a “social fact”, of which the law is a mere expression. It
disregarded the two significant components as far as national identity is concerned: the self-
perception of the individual, and the view of the concerned State. The reason for this is the
belief  that  there  is  something  more  “objective”  than  these.  It  considers  that  there  exists  an
106 Ibid., pp. 75-76.
107 Article 27 of the CCPR.
108 See article 14 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
entry into force 3 September 1953 and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities,
entry into force 1 February 1998.  The texts of the Conventions are available at the web site of the Council of
Europe at http://www.coe.int/, last visited 5 April 2006.
109 Nottebohm case, italics added.
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authentic and objectively verifiable link between the person and the country of his or her
nationality.110
In Akayesu the Chamber holds that a national group is defined as “a collection of people who
are perceived to share a legal bond based on common citizenship, coupled with reciprocity of
rights and duties”.111 The finding has been criticised, because the Chamber seems to link the
concept of ‘national group’ with that of the population of a nation state only, thereby
excluding most national minorities.112 This holding is also troublesome to reconcile with
Lemkin’s original idea of the protection of what were then called “national minorities” in a
continuation of the treaty regime established after the First World War.113 The Chamber has
been accused for incomplete reading of Nottebohm, because the case was about establishing
‘nationality’, not membership in a ‘national group’; it does not address the situation of
national minorities, who while sharing cultural and other bonds to a given State, may actually
hold the nationality of another State, or who may even be stateless.114
It seems that the Chamber proposed a too-restrictive definition of the national group in
Akayesu and, therefore, unnecessarily limited the scope of a protected group. It would be
preferable if the term of national would be understood as covering both ‘national’ as
sociological nation and ‘national’ as citizen.
4.3.2 Ethnical/Ethnic Group
The  question  of  ethnicity  is,  at  least,  as  controversial  as  nationality.  During  the  drafting
process of the Genocide Convention the term of ethnical was first introduced, then deleted,
and then reintroduced again. Sweden, which reintroduced the term, felt that use of the term
‘national’ might be confused with ‘political’. The Swedish delegate also noted that the
constituent factor of a minority might be its language. On the other hand, several States said
that they saw no difference between ethnical and racial groups. Remarking on confusion
110 Verdirame, supra note 86, p.591.
111 Akayesu Judgement, para. 512.
112 Schabas commentary, supra note 69, p. 541.
113 Ibid.
114 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 115.
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between  the  terms,  Haiti  observed  that  ‘ethnic’  might  well  apply  where  ‘racial’  was
problematic.115
The present practices of States are no less bewildering. For instance, Jews are treated in
Hungary as an ethnic minority, in Iran as a religious minority and in France neither.
Governments of Trinidad and Tobago, India, Malta, Benin, France and the Republic of Korea
have maintained that the phrase ‘ethnic minorities’ has no practical meaning or applicability
in their countries. The picture becomes even more blurred when including the States that
admit possessing a large number of ethnic minorities, e.g., Vietnam’s fifty and Mexico’s fifty-
six. In Finland, the Roma and the Sami are acknowledged as ethnic minorities, the latter also
as an indigenous people.116
 In 1996, the International Law Commission (the ILC) in its Draft Code of Crimes against the
Peace and Security of Mankind changed the word ‘ethnical’ in the definition of genocide to
‘ethnic’ in  article  17  to  reflect  modern  English  usage  without  affecting  the  substance  of  the
provision.117 It even considered whether it was necessary to retain both the terms ‘ethnical’
and ‘racial’ in the Draft Code. Special Rapporteur Doudou Thiam considered it “normal to
retain  these  two  terms,  which  give  the  text  on  genocide  a  broader  scope  covering  both
physical genocide and cultural genocide”. He observed that:
it seems that the ethnic bond is more cultural. It is based on cultural values and is characterized by a way of life,
a way of thinking and the same way of looking at life and things. On a deeper level, the ethnic group is based on
a cosmogony. The racial element, on the other hand, refers more typically to common physical traits.118
The term that comes closest describing the Tutsi, at least prima facie,  is  ‘ethnic’.  It  was,
however, somewhat premature for the Tribunal to concede already in the chapter “Genocide
in Rwanda in 1994?” that “it was indeed a particular group, the Tutsi ethnic group, which was
115 Ibid., p. 124.
116 Gayim, supra note 101, pp. 40-41. See also the footnotes 152-154.
117 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996,
UN Doc. A/51/10. para. 9. The text of the Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind with
Commentary is available on the web site of the ILC at http://www.un.org/law/ilc/, last visited 5 April 2006
(Draft Code of Crimes and Commentary).
118 Fourth Report on the Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, by Mr Doudou
Thiam, Special Rapporteur, UN Doc. A/CN.4/398, para. 58, printed in Yearbook, 1986, VII(1).
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targeted”119, while considering whether the massacres in Rwanda constituted genocide on
general level before any elaboration on the law of genocide.
The Tribunal finds in Akayesu that “An ethnic group is generally defined as a group whose
members share a common language or culture.”120 But  Tutsis  and  Hutus  speak  the  same
language, Kinyarwanda, share the same culture, and have no differences in their customary
practices, as the Tribunal observed. However the Tribunal observes that there are a number of
objective indicators of Tutsis as a group with a distinct identity. These indicators were listed
to be that every Rwandan citizen was required before 1994 to carry an identity card including
an entry for ethnic group, and that the Rwandan Constitution and laws identified Rwandans
by reference to their ethnic group (e.g., article 57 of the Civil Code of 1988 provided that a
person would be identified by ethnic group and article 118 of the same Code provided that
birth certificates would include a reference for ethnicity). In addition, the Tribunal noted that
customary rules existed in Rwanda governing the determination of an ethnic group, which
followed patrilineal lines of hereditary. The identification of persons as belonging to the
groups of Hutu, Tutsi or Twa had thus become embedded in Rwandan culture. Furthermore,
the Rwandan witnesses testifying before the Tribunal identified themselves by ethnic group,
and generally knew the ethnic group to which their friends and neighbours belonged.121
The Tribunal was evidently troubled with its own definition of ethnic group and with
classifying the Tutsi as one of the protected groups. Therefore, it went on suggesting that the
actual intent of the drafters of the Genocide Convention was to afford protection to any
“stable and permanent group”. This proposition is discussed in this study later.
4.3.3 Racial Group
The terms of ‘race’ seems to have worn out most of the four qualifiers of the groups since the
adoption of the Genocide Convention in 1948. Some present-day specialists have disputed the
term altogether, stating that ‘the term “race” is a socially constructed artefact – that there is no
such thing in reality as “race;” that the very word is racist; that the idea of “race,” implying
the existence of significant biologically determined mental differences rendering some
119 Akayesu Judgement, para. 124, italics added.
120 Akayesu Judgement, para. 513. Throughout the judgement is used the modern version of the word, instead of
“ethnical” used in the Statute.
121 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 170-171.
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populations inferior to others, is wholly false… ’.122 If taking a purely scientific view the term
race appears to have lost its justification, but it still has its significance, especially in popular
usage, social science and international law.
During the drafting process of the Genocide Convention the term ‘racial groups’ seemed to
pose the least problem for the drafters, although it may well be the most problematic today.
The travaux préparatoires reveal no significant discussion of the term. According to Schabas,
this suggests that it is very close to the core of what the drafters intended the Convention to
protect.  As a term, ‘racial groups’ was present throughout the whole drafting process, in
General Assembly Resolution 96(I), the Secretariat Draft, and the Drafts submitted by the
United States, France and China.123
The subsequent instrument International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination of 1965 defines “racial discrimination” as “any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin”. 124 The
Convention seems to juxtapose the terms racial, national and ethnic to some degree.
The Rwanda Tribunal in Akayesu adopted a more restrictive interpretation of the term racial
group stating that “the conventional definition of racial group is based on the hereditary
physical traits often identified with a geographical region, irrespective of linguistic, cultural,
national or religious factors”125, without giving any source for its “conventional definition”. In
the Kayishema & Ruzindana case the Tribunal followed the same formulation.126 On the other
hand, it is noted that at the time of the formulation of the Genocide Convention the meaning
of “racial groups” was much broader than it is today. It was to a large extent synonymous
with national, ethnic and religious groups. According to Schabas the 1948 meaning of “racial
group” should be favoured over some more contemporary and more restrictive
interpretations.127
122 Ashley Montagu, Man’s Most Dangerous Myth, The Fallacy of Race, sixth edition (AltaMira Press: Walnut
Creek, 1997), p. 31.
123 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 120.
124 The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD), adopted
and opened for signature and ratification by General Assembly resolution 2106 (XX) of 21 December 1965, 660
UNTS 195, art. 1(1), available at the wed site of the OHCHR at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm, last visited 5 April 2006.
125 Akayesu Judgement, para. 514.
126 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 98.
127 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 123.
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4.3.4 Religious Group
Religious groups were accepted to the list of protected groups right from the beginning of the
drafting process of the Genocide Convention. The term existed already, in the General
Assembly Resolution 96(I)128 requesting the United Nations Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC)  to  undertake  the  necessary  steps  to  draw  up  a  convention  on  the  crime  of
genocide, and in the early drafts of the convention.
The position of religious groups was, however, questioned by some delegates. The United
Kingdom impugned the inclusion of religious groups arguing that people were free to join and
to  leave  them.129 The Soviet Union also opposed the inclusion for ideological reasons. It
urged the term to be added in brackets after the reference to national groups.130 The abolition
or amendments were, however, rejected by the majority of the delegates.
Having a religious group as a protected group brings along the question of identifying a
religion. The Human Rights Committee has stated that “religion” should not be limited to
“traditional religions or to religions and beliefs with institutional characteristics analogous to
those of traditional religions”.131
The ICTR in Akayesu holds that a religious group is one “whose members share the same
religion, denomination or mode of worship”132 and in Kayishema & Ruzindana followed suit,
writing that “A religious group includes denomination or mode of worship or a group sharing
common beliefs.”133 According to Schabas these attempts at definitions are, once again, more
restrictive than both the drafters’ intent and the common meaning of the term in 1948.134
128 UN Doc. A/BUR/50.
129 UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.69.
130 UN Doc. A/C.6/223.
131 UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4, para. 2 (1993).
132 Akayesu Judgement, para. 515.
133 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 98.
134 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 128.
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4.3.5 “Permanent and Stable Groups”
In the course of history there have been several suggestions that other groups than those
mentioned in the Genocide Convention should be afforded protection.135 For example,
different drafts of the Convention mentioned political, economic, social and linguistic groups.
However, these suggestions did not gain enough support and were deleted from the final
version  of  the  text.  Nowadays  it  is  widely  held  that  the  list  of  protected  groups  is
exhaustive.136
There are references in national legislation, case law and academic writings to groups not
contemplated by the Convention. It has been suggested that, e.g., political, economic, social,
and linguistic groups and even gender as a group should be afforded protection under the
rubric of genocide. The ICTR was the first international tribunal to deliberate the matter.
In the Akayesu case the Trial Chamber of the ICTR attempted to define the protected groups
autonomously from each other. It ended up with rather rigid interpretations as can be seen
from the text above in this study. For the Tribunal the word ethnic came closest describing the
Tutsi, but this viewpoint was also problematic due to the definition of ethnic group adopted in
the judgement. The Tutsi could not be meaningfully distinguished from the majority Hutu
population in terms of language and culture.137 The Trial Chamber was clearly troubled with
its own legal findings on the law and facts and circumstances in Rwanda in 1994. It was
virtually impossible for the Chamber to conclude that genocide was not actually committed,
because the Tutsi cannot be subsumed into any of the protected groups, even though it would
seem so by a strict reading of the Trial Chamber’s interpretation of the law. As a solution to
this the Trial Chamber introduced the novel concept of “stable and permanent groups”.
The Akayesu judgement declared:
On reading through the travaux préparatoires of the Genocide Convention [Footnote 96. Summary Records of
the meetings of the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 21 September - 10 December 1948, Official
135 See chapter 4.5 above.
136 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 130.
137 Nevertheless, ethnic classification was applied when the Tribunal found Akayesu guilty of “a widespread or
systematic attack on the civilian population on ethnic grounds”, Akayesu Judgement, para. 653.
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Records of the General Assembly], it appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as targeting
only “stable” groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and membership of which is determined by birth, with
the exclusion of the more “mobile” groups which one joins through individual voluntary commitment, such as
political and economic groups. Therefore, a common criterion in the four types of groups protected by the
Genocide Convention is that membership in such groups would seem to be normally not challengeable by its
members, who belong to it automatically, by birth, in a continuous and often irremediable manner.138
The Trial Chamber went on:
Moreover, the Chamber considered whether the groups protected by the Genocide Convention, echoed in Article
2 of the Statute, should be limited to only the four groups expressly mentioned and whether they should not also
include any group which is stable and permanent like the said four groups. In other words, the question that
arises is whether it would be impossible to punish the physical destruction of a group as such under the Genocide
Convention, if the said group, although stable and membership is by birth, does not meet the definition of any
one of the four groups expressly protected by the Genocide Convention. In the opinion of the Chamber, it is
particularly important to respect the intention of the drafters of the Genocide Convention, which according to the
travaux préparatoires, was patently to ensure the protection of any stable and permanent group.139
While deliberating the law of genocide, the Trial Chamber itself questioned whether the
Genocide Convention also protects other groups than those explicitly mentioned. It resorted to
historical interpretation and relied upon the travaux préparatoires of the Convention. Based
on this material it made a daring proposal, that actually the intention of the drafters of the
Genocide Convention was to afford protection to “any stable and permanent group”. This
proposal is problematic in many ways.
First, the Trial Chamber’s opinion on the permanence of group membership does not
correspond with reality of world. When the four groups are examined more closely, they
reveal in practice only racial groups, when defined genetically, may claim some relatively
prolonged stability and permanence. National, ethnic and religious groups seem neither stable
nor permanent. Nationality may be changed, sometimes for large groups of individuals where,
for example, two countries have joined or secession has occurred. Religious groups may
appear and disappear within a lifetime. Individual members of ethnic groups may come and
138 Akayesu Judgement, para. 515.
139 Akayesu Judgement, para. 516.
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go, although there may be legal rules on determining ethnicity as a result of marriage or in the
case of children whose parents belong to different ethnic groups.140
Second, the Trial Chamber makes general reference to the travaux préparatoires in
justification of its interpretation. The preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of
its conclusion may be used as a supplementary means of interpretation according to the
Vienna Convention.141 It may be used to clarify ambiguous and obscure terms or those that
are manifestly absurd or unreasonable. However, the preparatory work may not be used to add
elements  that  are  not  in  the  treaty  already.  The  Tribunal  could  have  made  use  of  different
documents that were produced during the drafting process to explicate the actual meaning of
the four terms, but not read into the Genocide Convention something that is not there. This
kind of expansive interpretation is also objectionable when the treaty defines a criminal
offence, which should be subject to the principle of nullum crimen sine lege.
The subsequent judgements of the ICTR have departed somewhat from the Akayesu
judgement. The Kayishema & Ruzindana judgement of 21 May 1999 adopted a more
subjective approach towards the protected groups and wholly omitted mentioning the novel
concept of stable and permanent groups introduced less than a year earlier. The Rutaganda
and Musema judgements of 6 December 1999 and 27 January 2000 respectively, nonetheless,
adhere to the stable and permanent conception. In Bagilishema judgement of 7 June 2001 the
conception is omitted again. When examining the judgements a little closer one can see that
the appearance of the concept has to do with the composition of the Trial Chamber. It seems
that the concept has not gained general support among the judges of the ICTR.
4.3.6 Conclusion
In the case law of the ICTR on determining the membership of national, ethnic, racial or
religious groups can be seen the gradual shift from the objective to subjective position. In
Akayesu membership was determined wholly in objective terms, but already in Kayishema &
Ruzindana a more subjective approach was chosen emphasising group's self-identification and
identification by other, including the perpetrators of the crimes. This track has been followed
with minor modifications in Rutaganda and Musema, noting that concepts must be assessed
140 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 133.
141 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 32.
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within the light of a particular context of the society and identification by the perpetrator, and
in some instances the self-identification of the victim should be accepted.
It can be seen that membership of a group is essentially a subjective rather than an objective
concept. However, if a totally subjective approach is chosen, it may lead to unsatisfactory
results allowing, at least in theory, genocide be committed against a group without any
objective existence in the society. Therefore, it is necessary to determine some objective
existence of a group. The approach that tries to reconcile objective and subjective dimensions
of the group membership was adopted in the Bagilishema case. The Trial Chamber noted that
membership of the group must be an objective feature of the society in question, but there is
also  a  subjective  dimension.  Sometimes  it  may  be  difficult  to  determine  whether  or  not  a
victim was a member of a protected group. Moreover, occasionally the targeted group may be
characterised in ways that differ from conceptions of the group shared generally, or by other
segments of society. In such cases the Chamber resorted to the formulation of identification
by perpetrator. If a victim was perceived by a perpetrator as belonging to a protected group,
the victim could be considered as a member of the protected group, for the purposes of
genocide.
The approach to the protected groups adopted in the ICTR case law can be described as
seriatim. First, the respective chambers defined each adjective separately and then applied that
definition  to  the  situation  at  hand,  or  to  put  it  differently,  they  first  endeavoured  to  attach
meaning to each term, and then to place the victim group within that meaning.142
The seriatim approach was challenged in the Krstic case  of  the  ICTY.  The  ICTY  Trial
Chamber adopted an ensemble approach, by which the four terms were to be interpreted as
components of the concept of a national minority.143 First, the Trial Chamber noted that the
Genocide Convention does not protect all types of human groups. Its application is confined
to national, ethnical, racial and religious groups. The Chamber, however, acknowledged that
protected groups are not clearly defined in the Convention or elsewhere. Quite in contrast, the
142 Diane Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, International Criminal Law Review,
Vol. 2, No. 2 (2002), p.103, Amann speaks in the article about seriatim and ensemble approaches and finally
suggests that a combination of the both should be favoured calling that synthetic contextual inquiry.
143 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-98-33, 2 August 2001, para. 556, the ICTY judgements
are available at http://www.un.org/icty/, last visited 5 April 2006.
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concepts partially overlap and are on occasion synonymous.144 It  went  on  to  state  that  "To
attempt to differentiate each of the named groups on the basis of scientifically objective
criteria would thus be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the [Genocide]
Convention."145 Consequently, the Trial Chamber rejected attempts to distinguish the four
terms by any means. It declined to put any label on victims in terms of four qualifiers, but
simply called "the Bosnian Muslims" a "protected group".146
The issue of interpreting groups protected against genocide is not settled in international
criminal law. The same questions will arise in possible future trials. The International
Criminal Court, especially, will have to take a stand on the matter.
4.4 Underlying Offences
The last two material chapters of this study examine the underlying of offences (acts) of
genocide and the mental element of genocide. Before entering the acts of genocide, it is,
however, important to make a few remarks on the elements of crime in general. The notions
below are especially familiar to criminal lawyers.
In criminal law it is a general principle that a person may not be convicted of a crime unless
proved beyond reasonable doubt both (a) that he caused a certain event or that responsibility
is to be attributed to him for the existence of a certain state of affairs, which is forbidden by
criminal law, and (b) that he had a defined state of mind in relation to the causing of the event
or the existence of the state of affairs. The event or state of affairs is called the actus reus, and
the state of mind the mens rea of the crime.147
In the case of genocide it must be proved that one of the acts listed in article 2(2)(a) to (e) of
the Statute has been committed (actus reus), and that that act was committed with intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (mens rea).
The mens rea required separately for different underlying offences of genocide is discussed
144 Ibid., paras. 554-555.
145 Ibid., para. 556.
146 Ibid., para. 560.
147 John Smith and Brian Hogan, Criminal Law (Butterworths: London, 1996), p. 29.
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under each title in this chapter, when necessary. The genocidal intent is studied in the next
chapter. For questions related to protected groups see chapter 4.3 above.
The exhaustive list of acts of genocide in article 2(2)(a) to (e) of the Statute is as follows:
(a)     Killing members of the group;
(b)     Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c)     Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in
whole or in part;
(d)     Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e)     Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
Since the actus reus includes  all  the  elements  in  the  definition  of  the  crime  except  the
accused's mental element, if follows that the actus reus is not merely an act. It may consist of
a  state  of  affairs,  not  including  an  act  at  all.  The actus reus requires  proof  of  an  act  or  an
omission (conduct).148 An offence may be either an act of commission or an act of omission.
This principle also applies to all of the acts of genocide, including killing.149 Genocide can be
committed by omission, if the accused had a duty to act. This question was addressed in the
Kambanda judgement.150
Usually, it must be proved that the conduct had a particular result, e.g., killing requires that
the accused's conduct caused the death of a victim. Some offences do not require evidence of
any result. In the context of genocide, three of the five acts require proof of a result: (a) killing
members of the group, (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group or
(e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Two of the acts do not
demand such proof, but require a further specific intent: (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part or
(d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group. 151 Proof of a result  of a
crime also requires evidence that the act itself is a cause of the outcome. However, in many
cases this is not a contentious issue because the matter is not disputed.
148 Ibid., p. 31.
149 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 156.
150 Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, 4 September 1998, para.
39(ix), "Jean Kambanda acknowledges that on 3 May 1994, he was personally asked to take steps to protect
children who had survived the massacre at a hospital and he did not respond. On the same day, after the meeting,
the children were killed. He acknowledges that he failed in his duty to ensure the safety of the children and the
population of Rwanda."
151 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 155-156.
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4.4.1 Killing Members of the Group
Killing is the first  act  of genocide listed in article 2(2)(a) of the Statute.  Killing is the most
definitive way of committing genocide. It is a means of committing physical genocide to wipe
a human group out of existence.
The word "killing" aroused the question of interpretation in comparison with the counterpart
"meurtre" in the French version of the Statute. In Akayesu the Trial Chamber was of the
opinion that the term "killing" is too general, because "it could very well include both
intentional and unintentional homicides..." The French term "meurtre" was considered more
precise.  Taking  into  consideration  the  presumption  of  innocence  of  the  accused  and  the
general principles of criminal law, the Chamber held that the more favourable term "meurtre"
should be upheld and article 2(2)(a) of the Statute must be interpreted in accordance with the
definition of murder given in the Penal Code of Rwanda, according to which "meurtre"
(killing) is homicide committed with the intent to cause death.152
The issue was raised again in Kayishema & Ruzindana.  The  Trial  Chamber  agreed  that  if
doubt exists, for a matter of statutory interpretation, that doubt must be interpreted in favour
of the accused.  Therefore, the relevant act under article 2(2)(a) is “meurtre,”that is, unlawful
and intentional killing.  The Trial Chamber noted, however, that all the enumerated acts must
be committed with intent to destroy a group in whole or in part.  Referring to the Commentary
on the  ILC Draft  Code  of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind of 1996153, the
enumerated acts “are by their very nature conscious, intentional or volitional acts which an
individual could not usually commit without knowing that certain consequences were likely to
result.  They are not the type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as a result of
mere negligence . . . the definition of this crime requires a particular state of mind or a specific
intent with respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act."  Hence, there is virtually no
difference between the two, as the term “killing” is linked to the intent to destroy in whole or in
part.154 Killing/meurtre should therefore be considered along with the specific intent of genocide,
that is, the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as
152 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 500-501.
153 Draft Code of Crimes and Commentary, supra note 118.
154 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 103.
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such. The Trial Chamber's finding was later confirmed by the Appeals Chamber, but it, however,
emphasised that 'if the word “virtually” is interpreted in a manner that suggests a difference,
though minimal, between the two terms, it would construe them both as referring to
intentional but not necessarily premeditated murder, this being, in its view, the meaning to be
assigned to the word “meurtre”'.155
The reference to "members of the group" as victims of the genocidal act, may suggest that the
act itself must involve the killing at least two members of the group. From a grammatical
standpoint the phrase can just as easily apply to a single act of killing. In Akayesu, when
elaborating  the  intent  required,  the  Trial  Chamber  stated  that  "  the  act  must  have  been
committed against one or several individuals..."156 The ICC Elements of Crimes sets out that
killing one person is enough, if other requirements are fulfilled.157  However, the Elements are
not binding on the Court. They "shall assist the Court in the interpretation and application" of
the material articles of the ICC Statute, and they "shall be consistent" with the ICC
Statute".158
In Akayesu the Trial Chamber asked itself whether an assault on an individual who was not a
member of the protected group, but who was attacked within the context of genocide, could
be considered an act of genocide under the Statute. The Tribunal was convinced of Akayesu's
presence and participation when victim V, a Hutu man, was beaten with a stick and the butt of
a rifle by a communal policeman called Mugenzi and  by  a  member  of  the interahamwe
militia. The acts attributed to the accused constitute serious bodily and mental harm inflicted
on the victim. However, because the acts were perpetrated against a Hutu, they cannot,
therefore, constitute a crime of genocide against the Tutsi group.159
As a synthesis, the Semanza judgement set  out criteria,  which have to be met in order to be
held criminally liable for genocide by killing members of a group. In addition to showing that
an accused possessed an intent to destroy the group as such, in whole or in part, the
prosecutor must show that (1) the perpetrator intentionally killed one or more members of the
155 Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, 1 June 2001,
para. 151.
156 Akayesu Judgement, italics added, para. 521.
157 The ICC Elements of Crimes, adopted 9 September 2002, available on the web site of the ICC at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/, last visited 5 April 2006.
158 The Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted 17 July 1998, entry into force 1 July 2000, UN Doc.
A/CONF.183.9, available on the web site of the ICC at http://www.icc-cpi.int/, last visited 5 April 2006.
159 Akayesu Judgement, para. 711-712.
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group, without the necessity of premeditation; and (2) such victim or victims belonged to the
targeted ethnical, racial, national, or religious group.160
The causation was under deliberation in the Nahimana et al. case, so-called "media case".161
Nahimana, founder and ideologist of the Radio Télévision Libre des Mille Collines
(RTLMC), Barayagwiza,  high  ranking  board  member  of  the Comité d’initiative of  the
RTLMC and founding member of the Coalition for the Defence of Republic (CDR), and
Ngeze, chief editor of Kangura newspaper, were convicted for genocide, incitement to
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and crimes against humanity of extermination and
persecution. Nahimana and Ngeze were sentenced to life imprisonment and Barayagwiza was
sentenced to 35 years imprisonment.162
The Trial Chamber observed that "The nature of media is such that causation of killing and
other acts of genocide will necessarily be effected by an immediately proximate cause in
addition to the communication itself." According to the Chamber this does not diminish,
however, the causation to be attributed to the media, or the criminal accountability of those
responsible for the communication. The Chamber described the death of President
Habyarimana by  the  downing  of  the  President’s  plane  as  "the  trigger"  for  the  killing  of  the
Tutsi and the hate speech through media as "the bullets in the gun". The trigger had such a
deadly impact because the gun was loaded. Therefore, the Chamber considered that "the
killing  of  Tutsi  civilians  can  be  said  to  have  resulted,  at  least  in  part,  from  the  message  of
ethnic targeting for death that was clearly and effectively disseminated through the RTLMC,
Kangura and CDR, before and after 6 April 1994".163
4.4.2 Causing Serious Bodily or Mental Harm to Members of the Group
The second act of genocide covers situations of physical violence that fall short of actually
killing of the victim. This as well as killing are considered modes of physical genocide. The
160 Prosecutor v. Semanza, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, 15 May 2003, para. 319
(Semanza Judgement).
161 Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, 3
December 2003 (Nahimana et al. Judgement).
162 Press Release of the ICTR, ICTR/INFO-9-2-372.EN, Arusha, 3 December 2003, available at
http://www.ictr.org/, last visited 5 April 2006.
163 Nahimana et al. Judgement, para. 952-953.
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act may be committed through causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the
group.
The notion of acts that cause bodily harm is well known in domestic legal systems. It differs
from assault, requiring proof that actual harm has resulted. Domestic laws often recognise
degrees of assault causing bodily harm, distinguishing between harm in a general sense and
harm of a serious or permanent nature. The Statute does not specify that the harm caused be
permanent, but uses the adjective "serious" as a qualifier.164
In the Eichmann case of 1961 the District Court of Jerusalem stated that serious bodily and
mental harm of members of a group could be caused "by the enslavement, starvation,
deportation and persecution ... and by their [Jews] detention in ghettos, transit camps and
concentration camps in conditions which were designed to cause their degradation,
deprivation of their rights as human beings, and to suppress them and cause them inhumane
suffering and torture".165 In Akayesu the Trial Chamber ruled the phrase "serious bodily and
mental harm, without limiting itself thereto, to mean acts of torture, be they bodily or mental,
inhumane or degrading treatment, persecution".166 In the Kayishema & Ruzindana judgement
the phrase was stated to mean "harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or
causes any serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses".167
The mental element of the act of genocide requires that the perpetrator must have the intent to
cause serious bodily or mental harm to a member of the group. In Kayishema & Ruzindana it
was formulated "that an accused may be held liable under these circumstances only where, at
the time of the act, the accused had the intention to inflict serious mental harm in pursuit of
the specific intention to destroy a group in whole or in part".168 This seems to put the intent
threshold somewhat higher than in the case of genocide by the act of killing.
The USA, when ratifying the Genocide Convention, formulated an understanding saying that
'[T]he United States Government understands and construes the word "mental harm" ... to
164 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 160.
165 Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolph Eichmann, District Court of Jerusalem, 12
December 1961, in: International Law Reports, vol. 36, (1968) (Eichmann case), p. 340.
166 Akayesu Judgement, para. 504.
167 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 109.
168 Ibid., para. 112.
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mean permanent impairment of mental faculties'.169 Bryant is of the opinion that 'the ordinary
meaning of the phrase "mental harm" in the context of the Genocide Convention does not
necessarily imply "permanent" injury and construing the term as understanding [ ] does may
be erroneous in view of the object and purpose of the Convention'.170 In Akayesu the  Trial
Chamber  cast  aside  the  requirement  of  permanence  of  mental  harm,  stating  that,  "bodily  or
mental harm to members of the group does not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent
and irremediable"171 However, according to the Semanza judgement serious mental harm is
understood "to mean more than minor or temporary impairment of mental faculties".172
4.4.3 Inflicting on the Group Conditions of Life
This act of genocide takes another step further off actual physical destruction of the group, or
to put it differently, the criminalisation of the act provides an outer circle of protection to the
existence of the group. Article 2(2)(c) stipulates that genocide may be committed by
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part.
The Trial Chamber in Akayesu interpreted the provision holding "that the expression
deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part, should be construed as the methods of destruction by which
the  perpetrator  does  not  immediately  kill  the  members  of  the  group,  but  which,  ultimately,
seek their physical destruction." Means of deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of
life include, inter alia, subjecting a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic expulsion
from homes and the reduction of essential medical services below minimum requirement.173
The infliction on the group conditions of life was interpreted in the Kayishema & Ruzindana
judgement "to include circumstances which will lead to a slow death, for example, lack of
proper housing, clothing, hygiene and medical care or excessive work or physical exertion."
The methods include rape, the starving of a group of people, reducing required medical
services below a minimum, and withholding sufficient living accommodation for a reasonable
169 Cited in: Bunyan Bryant and Robert H. Jones, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention,
Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 16, No. 1 (1975), p. 693.
170 Ibid., p. 695.
171 Akayesu Judgement, para. 502.
172 Semanza Judgement, para. 321.
173 Akayesu Judgement, para. 505-506.
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period, provided that the above would lead to the destruction of the group in whole or in
part.174
Contrary to the acts of genocide examined above, killing and causing serious bodily or mental
harm, the offence of deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about group's destruction does not require proof of result. The conditions of life must be
calculated to bring about the destruction, but whether the result is achieved or not is
irrelevant. The distinction was made already in the Eichmann case of 1961. The accused was
charged with imposing living conditions upon Jews calculated to bring about their physical
extermination. In accordance to the District Court of Jerusalem, such a charge was only
applicable to the persecution of Jews who had survived the Holocaust. The Court ruled:
We do not think that conviction on the second Count [imposing living conditions calculated to bring about the
destruction] should also include those Jews who were not saved, as if in their case there were two separate acts -
first, subjection to living conditions calculated to bring about their physical destruction, and later the physical
destruction itself.175
Theoretically speaking all five acts of genocide can be committed by omission, but the
question of positive duty to act rises especially in relation subparagraph (c). Because of the
overall genocidal intent requirement, not to mention the requirement in the subparagraph that
the conditions be calculated, the omission cannot be one of simple negligence.176
Article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute provides some lead to the assessment of superior
responsibility. It provides that "The fact that any of the acts ... was committed by a
subordinate does not relieve his or her superior of criminal responsibility if he or she knew or
had reason to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the
superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish
the perpetrators thereof." Article 28 of the ICC Statute elaborates the superior responsibility in
more detail. It imposes on military and civilian superiors a positive duty to act to prevent
genocide.
174 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 115-116.
175 Eichmann case, para. 196.
176 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 170.
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It may be difficult to establish the extent of requirements for a State, or for an individual, in
terms of assuring adequate nutrition, medical care and housing. International human rights
law may provide helpful guidance on the matter.177
4.4.4 Preventing Births within the Group
The second last act of genocide in article 2(2)(d) of the Statute contains the provision on
biological genocide. Genocide can be committed by imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the protected group.
In the Akayesu judgement the Trial Chamber was of the opinion "that the measures intended
to prevent births within the group, should be construed as sexual mutilation, the practice of
sterilization, forced birth control, separation of the sexes and prohibition of marriages". In the
Rwandan context it pointed out that " In patriarchal societies, where membership of a group is
determined by the identity of the father, an example of a measure intended to prevent births
within a group is the case where, during rape, a woman of the said group is deliberately
impregnated by a man of another group, with the intent to have her give birth to a child who
will consequently not belong to its mother's group." In addition, "that measures intended to
prevent births within the group may be physical, but can also be mental. For instance, rape
can be a measure intended to prevent births when the person raped refuses subsequently to
procreate, in the same way that members of a group can be led, through threats or trauma, not
to procreate".178 The Musema judgement followed suit, except it omitted mentioning rape as a
measure intended to prevent births.179
Such views on rape may seem exaggerated, because it is unrealistic and perhaps absurd to
believe that a group can be destroyed in whole or part by rape and similar crimes. One should
read the subparagraph (d) carefully in comparison to subparagraph (c). Paragraph (d) does not
require that the measures to restrict births be "calculated" to bring about the destruction of the
group in whole or part, only that they be intended to prevent births within the group. Such
measures can be merely auxiliary to a genocidal plan or programme.180
177 Ibid., p. 171.
178 Akayesu Judgement, para. 507-508.
179 Musema Judgement, para. 158.
180 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 174.
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Article 2(2)(d) of the does not require a result as a material element of the offence. The actus
reus consists of the imposition of the measures. Whether a result follows is irrelevant.
4.4.5 Forcibly Transferring Children
The last act of genocide is provided in article 2(2)(e): forcibly transferring children of the
group to another group. The subparagraph had a somewhat peculiar preparation, or lack of it,
after it came into being. It was added to the Genocide Convention almost as an afterthought,
with little substantive debate or consideration. The provision is enigmatic, because the
drafters clearly rejected the concept of cultural genocide.181 The International Law
Commission treated paragraph (e) of the Convention as "biological genocide".182
The Statute  or  the  Genocide  Convention  does  not  specify  what  is  meant  by  "children".  The
Convention on the Rights of the Child gives an authoritative precedent, defining a child as
every human being below the age of 18 years.183 The ICC Elements of Crimes also define a
child as a person under the age of 18 years.184 However, the genocidal act of transferring
children only makes sense with relatively young children. Older children are more unlikely to
lose their cultural identity by such a transfer.
Article 2(2)(e) stipulates that the transfer of children must be done forcibly. In Akayesu the
Chamber opined that, "the objective is not only to sanction a direct act of forcible physical
transfer, but also to sanction acts of threats or trauma which would lead to the forcible transfer
of children from one group to another".185 The ICC Element of Crimes states that  'The term
"forcibly" is not restricted to physical force, but may include threat of force or coercion, such
as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of
power, against such person or persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive
environment."
181 Ibid., p. 175.
182 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-First Session,
UN Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1989/Add.1 (Part 2), p. 59, para. 160.
183 Convention on the Rights of the Child, UN Doc. A/RES/44/25, annex, art. 1, available on the web site of
Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights at http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm, last visited 5
April 2006.
184 The ICC Elements of Crimes, supra note 158.
185 Akayesu Judgement, para. 509.
50
4.4.6 Rape as an Act of Genocide
Rape of Tutsi women during the havoc was systematic and large scale. It was used as a way to
cause serious harm to the women and to deteriorate the Tutsi group as a whole. Rapes were
usually carried out under extreme circumstances, e.g., the victims were either threatened to be
killed or actually killed after the act.
Rape was defined in the Akayesu judgement as a physical invasion of a sexual nature,
committed on a person under circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence, which
includes rape, is defined as any act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive. Sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the
human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.
As an example of sexual violence the Trial Chamber provided an incident where the accused
ordered a student to undress and forced her to do gymnastics naked in the public courtyard of
the bureau communal, in front of a crowd. According to the judgement, sexual violence falls
within the scope of "other inhumane acts", set forth article 3(i) of the Tribunal's Statute,
"outrages upon personal dignity," set forth in article 4(e) of the Statute, and "serious bodily or
mental harm," set forth in article 2(2)(b) of the Statute. 186
On rape and sexual violence against Tutsi women the Tribunal went on saying:
...the Chamber wishes to underscore the fact that in its opinion, they [rape and sexual violence] constitute
genocide in the same way as any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy, in
whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such. Indeed, rape and sexual violence certainly constitute
infliction of serious bodily and mental harm on the victims and are even, according to the Chamber, one of the
worst ways of inflict harm on the victim as he or she suffers both bodily and mental harm. In light of all the
evidence before it, the Chamber is satisfied that the acts of rape and sexual violence described above, were
committed solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation,
mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or in other public places,
and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi
women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction,
specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the
Tutsi group as a whole.
186 Akayesu Judgement, para. 688.
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The rape of Tutsi women was systematic and was perpetrated against all Tutsi women and solely against them. A
Tutsi woman, married to a Hutu, testified before the Chamber that she was not raped because her ethnic
background was unknown. As part of the propaganda campaign geared to mobilizing the Hutu against the Tutsi,
the Tutsi women were presented as sexual objects. Indeed, the Chamber was told, for an example, that before
being raped and killed, Alexia, who was the wife of the Professor, Ntereye, and her two nieces, were forced by
the Interahamwe to undress and ordered to run and do exercises "in order to display the thighs of Tutsi women".
The Interahamwe who raped Alexia said, as he threw her on the ground and got on top of her, "let us now see
what the vagina of a Tutsi woman takes like". As stated above, Akayesu himself, speaking to the Interahamwe
who  were  committing  the  rapes,  said  to  them:  "don't  ever  ask  again  what  a  Tutsi  woman  tastes  like".  This
sexualized representation of ethnic identity graphically illustrates that tutsi women were subjected to sexual
violence because they were Tutsi. Sexual violence was a step in the process of destruction of the tutsi group -
destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life itself.
... in most cases, the rapes of Tutsi women in Taba, were accompanied with the intent to kill those women. Many
rapes were perpetrated near mass graves where the women were taken to be killed. A victim testified that Tutsi
women caught could be taken away by peasants and men with the promise that they would be collected later to
be executed. Following an act of gang rape, a witness heard Akayesu say "tomorrow they will be killed" and
they were actually killed. In this respect, it appears clearly to the Chamber that the acts of rape and sexual
violence, as other acts of serious bodily and mental harm committed against the Tutsi, reflected the
determination to make Tutsi women suffer and to mutilate them even before killing them, the intent being to
destroy the Tutsi group while inflicting acute suffering on its members in the process.
...the Chamber finds firstly that the acts described supra are indeed acts as enumerated in Article 2 (2) of the
Statute, which constitute the factual elements of the crime of genocide, namely the killings of Tutsi or the serious
bodily and mental harm inflicted on the Tutsi. The Chamber is further satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that
these various acts were committed by Akayesu with the specific intent to destroy the Tutsi group, as such.187
The treatment  of  rape  and  sexual  violence  in  the  ICTR case  law,  especially  in  the Akayesu
judgement, constitutes a major contribution to the development of the law of genocide. The
initial indictment did not include gender-based crimes, but the indictment was amended in this
respect after pressure from non-governmental organisations. Apparently the Akayesu case law
had an effect  on the ICC then under development.  Nowadays,  The ICC Elements of Crimes
provide that the "conduct may include, but is not necessarily restricted to, acts of torture,
rape, sexual violence or inhuman or degrading treatment".188
187 Ibid., paras. 731-734.
188 The ICC Elements of Crimes, italics added, supra note 158, footnote 3.
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4.4.7 Conclusion
In relation to killing, it seemed at first that the Tribunal found some difference between the
words killing and meurtre, but the issue was settled later on in the Appeals Chamber
judgement affirming that there is virtually no difference between the two terms in the context of
genocide. Both should be construed as referring to intentional but not necessarily premeditated
murder.
Before the Akayesu judgement there was some confusion about the nature of mental harm
caused by the perpetrator. The judgement, however, discarded the requirement of permanence
ruling, i.e. that mental harm does not necessarily mean that the harm is permanent and
irremediable.
Perhaps the treatment of sexual violence by the Tribunal has the most long-lasting impact on
international criminal law. The Tribunal found that rape and sexual violence falls within the
scope of serious bodily or mental harm.  They  constitute  genocide  in  the  same  way  as  any
other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to destroy. The Tribunal
made a seminal ruling in this respect.
So far the Tribunal has found several convictions of genocide by killing and causing serious
bodily  or  mental  harm  to  members  of  the  group189; some convictions of direct and public
incitement  to  commit  genocide  [2(3)(c)  of  the  Statute]190; and few of conspiracy to commit
genocide [2(3)(b)]191 and complicity in genocide [2(3)(e)]192.
4.5 Mental Element or Mens Rea of Genocide
In criminal law it is required that the accused had a defined state of mind, mens rea, when
committing a crime. Generally, for ordinary crimes recklessness or negligence may suffice for
189 E.g., Akayesu Judgement, Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, Rutaganda Judgement, Musema Judgement
and Niyitegeka Judgement.
190 E.g., Akayesu Judgement and Nahimana et al. Judgement.
191 E.g., Niyitegeka Judgement and Nahimana et al. Judgement.
192 E.g., Semanza Judgement.
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the mens rea requirement, while a conviction of genocide necessitates that the offender acted
with intent. The mental element of genocide has two layers. The perpetrator must have the
required mens rea of each underlying offence, e.g., killing, and, furthermore, the genocidal
intent that separates genocide from ordinary crime of murder, for example. Article 2(2) of the
Statute requires that the accused acted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical,  racial  or  religious  group,  as  such.  Consequently,  the  perpetrator  must  have  the
intention to destroy a protected group. This chapter focuses on the genocidal intent of the
crime.
4.5.1 Knowledge
In national criminal law it is commonly stated that the mens rea of  a  crime  has  two
components that are knowledge and intent. Also article 30 of the ICC Statute provides that "a
person shall be criminally responsible...only if the material elements are committed with
intent and knowledge."193
According to the ICC Statute, "knowledge" means awareness that a circumstance exists or a
consequence will occur in the ordinary course of events.194 Thus the perpetrator must have
knowledge of the circumstances of the crime. Because of the scope of genocide, it can hardly
be committed by an individual acting alone. While exceptions cannot be ruled out, it is
virtually impossible to imagine genocide that is not planned and organised either by the State
itself or by some clique associated with it. For genocide to take place there must be a plan,
even though there is nothing in the Genocide Convention that requires this.195 In Kayishema
& Ruzindana, the ICTR wrote that "although a specific plan to destroy does not constitute an
element of genocide, it would appear that it is not easy to carry out genocide without such a
plan, or organisation".196 In  addition  it  clarified  that  "the  existence  of  such  a  plan  would  be
strong evidence of the specific intent requirement for the crime of genocide".197
193 The ICC Statute, supra note 159, art. 30.
194 Ibid., art. 30(3).
195 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 207.
196 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 94.
197 Ibid., para. 276.
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The plan or circumstances of genocide must be known to the offender. An individual who is
not aware of the circumstances cannot be found guilty of the crime of genocide, but maybe of
some lesser offence.
The  International  Law  Commission  considered  the  issue  of  the  extent  of  knowledge  in  the
commentary on the Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind:
The  extent  of  knowledge  of  the  details  of  a  plan  or  a  policy  to  carry  out  the  crime  of  genocide  would  vary
depending on the position of the perpetrator in the governmental hierarchy or the military command structure.
This does not mean that a subordinate who actually carries out the plan or policy cannot be held responsible for
the crime of genocide simply because he did not possess the same degree of information concerning the overall
plan or policy as his superiors. The definition of the crime of genocide requires a degree of knowledge of the
ultimate objective of the criminal conduct rather than knowledge of every detail of a comprehensive plan or
policy of genocide. A subordinate is presumed to know the intentions of his superiors when he receives orders to
commit the prohibited acts against individuals who belong to a particular group. He cannot escape responsibility
if he carries out the orders to commit the destructive acts against victims who are selected because of their
membership in a particular group by claiming that he was not privy to all aspects of the comprehensive
genocidal plan or policy.198
The accused must also have knowledge of the consequences of his or her act in the ordinary
course of events. Knowledge of the consequences will vary depending on the act with which
the accused is charged. In some cases, the genocidal act does not require proof of
consequences. As an example of this can be the direct and public incitement to genocide
provided in article 2(3)(c) of the ICTR Statute. In the Akayesu case the Tribunal stated in
passing on the threshold of knowledge of consequences. "The offender is culpable because he
knew or should have known that  the  act  committed  would  destroy,  in  whole  or  in  part,  a
group.”199 The "should have known" standard is generally in criminal law used to describe
crimes of negligence and is inappropriate in the case of genocide charges.
198 Draft Code of Crimes and Commentary, supra note 118, p. 90.
199 Akayesu Judgement, italics added, para. 520.
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4.5.2 Intent
Genocide is a crime that requires intent. Even without the term "with intent" in the definition
of genocide, it is inconceivable that an infraction of such magnitude could be committed
unintentionally.200
Article 30 of the ICC Statute provides that a person has intent where, in relation to conduct,
that person means to engage in the conduct; or in relation to a consequence, that person means
to cause the consequence or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events. It can
be seen that the words "with intent" that appear in the chapeau of article II of the Genocide
Convention  (article  2  of  the  ICTR Statute)  do  more  than  simply  reiterate  that  genocide  is  a
crime of intent. According to Schabas, article II of the Genocide Convention introduces a
precise description of the intent. The reference to intent in the text indicates that the
prosecution must go beyond establishing that the offender meant to engage in the conduct, or
meant to cause the consequence. It must be proven that the offender had a "specific intent" or
dolus specialis.201
The abovementioned description of genocidal intent as "specific intent" is nowadays the
predominant position. It can be seen, e.g., from the case law represented in this study below.
However, some scholars note that the two layers of the mental element are not differentiated
enough in legal literature and praxis. Otto Triffterer argues in his article that the two
subjective mental elements of genocide, first, intent as mens rea with regard to the actus reus
and, second, "intent to destroy", have different points of reference, and that they have to be
established separately and their scope be considered independent of each other. He goes on to
say that quite often jurisprudence and literature do not sufficiently distinguish between this
mens rea and  the  additional  "intent  to  destroy".  In  relation  to  "intent  to  destroy",  Triffterer
furthermore suggests that, "Looking at the definitions of genocide in international
instruments, they always correspondingly demand 'intent to destroy [...].' Nowhere is
mentioned an additional adjective such as specific, special, particular, or general intent. The
word intent, characterizing this genocidal intent in the narrow sense, therefore needs to be
200 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 213-214.
201 Ibid., p. 214.
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interpreted."202 Triffterer is quite right in saying that the texts of instruments do not require
specific or special intent. However, genocidal intent defined as – intent to destroy, in whole or
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such – may naturally be called
specific as distinct from the mens rea of each underlying offence. Here the word “specific” is
understood to mean additional or ulterior intent, intent to destroy a group. The offender seeks
an ulterior consequence that cannot usually result from his or her acts alone. An individual is
hardly ever in a position to be able to destroy a population in whole or part acting alone.
4.5.2.1 Specific Intent or Dolus Specialis
As already stated above it is clear that the acts of genocide must be committed with intent to
destroy a group. This intent is usually called "specific" intent, "special" intent or in Latin
dolus specialis. "Specific" intent is used in the common law system to distinguish offences of
"general" intent, which are crimes for which no particular level of intent is actually set out in
the text of the infraction. A specific intent offence requires performance of the actus reus but
in association with an intent or purpose that goes beyond mere performance of the act.203
The Rwanda Tribunal described genocidal intent in Akayesu in the following way:
Genocide is distinct from other crimes inasmuch as it embodies a special intent or dolus specialis. Special intent
of a crime is the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus, the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in "the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such".
Thus, for a crime of genocide to have been committed, it is necessary that one of the acts listed under Article
2(2) of the Statute be committed, that the particular act be committed against a specifically targeted group, it
being a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.204
The Tribunal went on:
Special intent is a well-known criminal law concept in the Roman-continental legal systems. It is required as a
constituent element of certain offences and demands that the perpetrator have the clear intent to cause the
202 Otto Triffterer, Genocide, Its Particular Intent to Destroy in Whole or in Part the Group as Such, Leiden
Journal of International Law, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), p. 404.
203 Schabas, supra note 85, pp. 217-218.
204 Akayesu Judgement, paras. 498-499.
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offence charged. According to this meaning, special intent is the key element of an intentional offence, which
offence is characterized by a psychological relationship between the physical result and the mental state of the
perpetrator.205
The special nature of genocide compared to other crimes in the Statute was underlined in the
Kambanda case. The Trial Chamber was of the opinion that "the crime of genocide is unique
because of its element of dolus specialis... hence the Chamber is of the opinion that genocide
constitutes the crime of crimes".206 The  placing  of  the  crime  of  genocide  on  the  apex  of
international crimes is not accepted by all scholars, noting that there is no hierarchy among
the crimes. From the practical viewpoint, crimes against humanity and war crimes may well
be equally destructive as genocide in some situations.
In the commentary on the ILC Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, the
ILC defines genocide's specific intent as "which is the distinguishing characteristic of this
particular crime under international law".207 It continued:
The  prohibited  acts  enumerated  in  subparagraphs  (a)  to  (e)  are  by  their  very  nature  conscious,  intentional  or
volitional acts which an individual could not usually commit without knowing that certain consequences were
likely to result. These are not the type of acts that would normally occur by accident or even as a result of mere
negligence. However, a general intent to commit one of the enumerated acts combined with a general awareness
of the probable consequences of such an act with respect to the immediate victim or victims is not sufficient for
the crime of genocide. The definition of this crime requires a particular state of mind or a specific intent with
respect to the overall consequences of the prohibited act.... an individual incurs responsibility for the crime of
genocide only when one of the prohibited acts is "committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnic, racial or religious group, as such".208
The quotations of the ICTR case law and the ILC commentary above emphasise the volitive
side of the mens rea requirement of genocide. In the context of Rwanda it may be partly due
to the quite clear-cut nature of the genocide that took place. When the question is about the
state of mind of the principal offender of genocide, the stress on volition may not present
difficulties, but when a person is charged with criminal participation in genocide, e.g.,
complicity in genocide, this position may lead to controversy.
205 Ibid., para. 518.
206 Kambanda Judgement, para. 16.
207 Draft Code of Crimes and Commentary, supra note 118, p. 87.
208 Ibid., italics added, p. 87.
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Alexander K.A. Greenawalt offers an alternative understanding of genocidal intent in his
article of 1999. He challenges the prevailing interpretation of genocidal intent, namely that
genocide is a crime of specific intent involving a perpetrator who specifically targets victims
on the basis of their group identity with a deliberate desire to inflict destruction upon the
group itself. He proposes instead that, "In cases where a perpetrator is otherwise liable for a
genocidal act, the requirement of genocidal intent should be satisfied if the perpetrator acted
in furtherance of a campaign targeting members of a protected group and knew that the goal
or manifest effect of the campaign was the destruction of the group in whole or in part."209 He
justifies his position by claiming that this approach emphasises the destructive result of
genocide instead of the specific reasons that move particular individuals to perform such acts.
Furthermore, it addresses the related problems of subordinate actors and ambiguous goals by
unhinging the question of genocidal liability from that of the perpetrator's particular motive or
desires with regard to the group as a whole.
4.5.2.2 Proof of Intent
All  the  elements  of  a  crime,  including  the  mental  element,  have  to  be  substantiated.  In
practice, proof of intent is rarely a formal part of the prosecution’s case. The prosecution does
not  generally  call  psychiatrists  as  expert  witnesses  to  establish  what  the  accused  really
intended. Rather, the intent is a logical deduction that flows from evidence of the material
acts. Criminal law presumes that an individual intends the consequences of his or her acts, in
effect deducing the existence of the mens rea from proof of the physical act itself.210
The Trial Chamber in the Akayesu case considered that “intent is a mental factor which is
difficult, even impossible, to determine”, but found that “in the absence of a confession from
the accused, his intent can be inferred from a certain number of presumptions of fact”.211
Partly citing the Yugoslavia Tribunal, the Trial Chamber found that intent may be inferred
from the following factors:
209 Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Rethinking Genocidal Intent: The Case for a Knowledge-Based Interpretation,
Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 8 (December 1999), p. 2288.
210 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 222.
211 Akayesu Judgement, para. 523.
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· the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against that same
group, whether . . . committed by the same offender or by others;
· the scale of atrocities committed;
· the general nature of the atrocities committed in a region or a country;
· the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of their membership of a
particular group, while excluding the members of other groups;
· the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts;
· the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts; or
· the perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves consider to violate the very
foundation  of  the  group-  acts  which  are  not  in  themselves  covered  by  the  list  .  .  .  but  which  are
committed as part of the same pattern of conduct.212
The Trial Chamber conceived that the context of the perpetration of other culpable acts, even
by others, political doctrine and the perpetration of acts, e.g., attacks against cultural
institutions and monuments, which are not themselves enlisted in article 3(2) of the Statute,
are suitable material for inference of the accused’s intent. This calls for caution, because the
question at stake is the determination of individualised intent. Therefore, in Bagilishema the
Trial Chamber notes that, “the use of context to determine the intent of an accused must be
counterbalanced with the actual conduct of the Accused”.213 The context may help in
determination, but the accused’s intent should be determined above all from his words and
deeds, and should be evident from patterns of purposeful action.
As already pointed out above, it is virtually impossible for the crime of genocide to be
committed without some or indirect involvement on the part of the State, given the magnitude
of  this  crime.  Although a  plan  of  genocide  is  not  an  element  of  the  crime,  the  existence  of
such a plan may be used as evidence of the specific intent of genocide.
4.5.3 Components of Specific Intent
The specific intent of genocide has three components. The offender must intend 1) to destroy
the group, the offender must intend that the group be destroyed 2) in whole or in part, and the
offender must intend to destroy a group that is defined by 3) nationality, ethnicity, race or
religion. Questions related to the groups are examined in detail in chapter 4.3 above and,
212 Ibid., para. 523-254.
213 Bagilishema Judgement, para. 63.
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therefore, comments on them are not repeated here. Under the last subtitle the question of
motive is examined.
4.5.3.1 “To Destroy”
Article II of the Genocide Convention provides that the offender must intend “to destroy” a
protected group. The question that arises here is what type of destruction is covered. Raphael
Lemkin took a wide view of this concept, observing that genocide involved the destruction of
political institutions, economic life, language and culture. Physical destruction was only the
ultimate or final stage in genocide.214 Nevertheless, the drafters of the Convention clearly
chose to limit its scope to physical and biological genocide.215
During the consideration of the Draft Code of Crimes, the International Law Commission
addressed the question of destruction:
As clearly shown by the preparatory work for the Convention, the destruction in question is the material
destruction of a group either by physical or by biological means, not the destruction of the national, linguistic,
religious, cultural or other identity of a particular group. The national or religious element and the racial or
ethnic element are not taken into consideration in the definition of the word "destruction", which must be taken
only in its material sense, its physical or biological sense. It is true that the 1947 draft Convention prepared by
the Secretary-General and the 1948 draft prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on Genocide contained provisions
on "cultural genocide" covering any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion or
culture of a group, such as prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools or
the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group or destroying or preventing the use of
libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of
the group. However, the text of the Convention, as prepared by the Sixth Committee and adopted by the General
Assembly, did not include the concept of "cultural genocide" contained in the two drafts and simply listed acts
which come within the category of "physical" or "biological" genocide. 121/ The first three subparagraphs of the
present article list acts of "physical genocide", while the last two list acts of "biological genocide".216
The ICTR aligned itself with the abovementioned position in the Semanza judgement, stating
that, ‘The drafters of the Genocide Convention, from which the Tribunal’s Statute borrows the
214 Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, cited in Schabas, supra note 85, p. 229.
215 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 229.
216 Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth
Session, 6 May - 26 July 1996, UN Doc. A/51/10, pp. 90-91.
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definition of genocide verbatim, unequivocally chose to restrict the meaning of “destroy” to
encompass only acts that amount to physical or biological genocide.’217
4.5.3.2  “In Whole or in Part”
The definition of genocide provides that the offender must intend to destroy a group “in whole
or in part”. It declares that it is not necessary to seek the eradication of the whole group. It is
enough, if the offender had the intention to destroy that group partially. But the question
remains, what is the extent of the intended partial destruction. The mere letter of the Genocide
Convention  [article  2(2)  of  the  Statute]  seems  to  allow  any  intention  to  partially  destroy  a
group to fall within the definition of genocide. The Genocide Convention has not, however,
been interpreted only relying on the literal reading of the definition of genocide.
During the drafting process of the Genocide Convention the formulation of partial destruction
already appeared in the preamble of General Assembly Resolution 96(I).218 Some states,
however, opposed any “partial” formulation, because that might result in an excessively low
quantitative threshold. Finally, the words “in whole or in part” were inserted in the final draft
according to the Norwegian proposal. The debates, however, provide little guidance as to
what the drafters meant by “in part”.219
Here should be pointed out that during the drafting of the Convention there was some
confusion made between the material element and the mental element of the crime. The
matter in question is the intent as opposed to the actual destruction. It is not to establish
whether all or part of a group was actually destroyed, but to ascertain whether the perpetrator
intended to destroy the group in whole or in part. Even a small number of actual victims is
enough to establish the material element.220
217 Semanza Judgement, para. 315.
218 General Assembly Resolution 96(I), UN Doc. A/BUR/50.
219 For more information on the drafting process see Schabas, supra note 85, pp. 230-233.
220 ‘Contrary to popular belief, the crime of genocide does not imply the actual extermination of group in its
entirety, but is understood as such once any one of the acts mentioned in Article 2(2)(a) through 2(2)(e) is
committed with the specific intent to destroy "in whole or in part" a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.’,
Akayesu Judgement, para. 497.
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The USA struggled for decades with the ratification of the Genocide Convention.221 During
the process there was intense disagreement in the U.S. Senate over how to interpret the two
parts  of  the  phrase  in  which  the  word  “intent”  appears  –  “intent  to  destroy,  in  whole  or  in
part”. This led the Foreign Relations Committee to propose an understanding on the matter
stating:
That the U.S. Government understands and construes the words “intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such,” appearing in article II to mean the intent to destroy a national,
ethnical, racial, or religious group by the acts specified in article II in such manner as to affect a substantial part
of the group concerned.222
The understanding has been criticised because it does not seem to clarify the problem but
instead raises additional problems, one being the determination of what constitutes a
“substantial part” of the group concerned. It is not even clear if “substantial part” refers to an
absolute or relative number of victims. The understanding proposed, and later on made upon
ratification, does not resolve the problem it purports to address, but merely reformulates it.223
In the ICTR praxis on the “in whole or in part” requirement is not thoroughly examined due
to the nature of the conflict in Rwanda. There is little room for ambiguity as to whether the
requirement is satisfied, because of the overwhelming scale of the anti-Tutsi extermination
campaign in Rwanda. The ICTR Trial Chambers broadly followed the guidance provided in
the ILC Draft Code of Crimes stating that “it is not necessary to intend to achieve the
complete annihilation of a group from every corner of the globe”, but “the crime of genocide
by its very nature requires the intention to destroy a substantial part of a particular group”.224
In the Kayishema & Ruzindana case  the  Trial  Chamber  opined  that  ‘“in  part”  requires  the
221 The USA is the original signatory State to the Genocide Convention, but the Convention was ratified only just
25 November 1988.
222 The text of the understanding is reproduced in Lawrence J. LeBlanc, The Intent to Destroy Groups in the
Genocide Convention: The Proposed U.S. Understanding, American Journal of International Law, Vol. 78
(1984), p. 370.
223 Bryant and Jones, The United States and the 1948 Genocide Convention, pp. 692-693. See also David
Alonzo-Maizlish, In Whole or in Part: Group Rights, the Intent Element of Genocide, and the “Quantitative
Criterion”, New York University Law Review, Vol. 77, No. 5 ( November 2002),. Alonzo-Maizlish strongly
criticises the “quantitative criterion” brought up, especially in the ICTY case law, stating that ‘As a threshold
requirement, the “quantitative criterion” is incompatible with the group-held right to exist on which the concept
of genocide is premised. Although the tribunals may look to the quantity of victims when inferring genocidal
intent, the emerging doctrine of the ICTY risks undermining the object and purpose of the Genocide Convention
on which the former’s statute is based.’, p. 1374-1375.
224 Draft Code of Crimes and Commentary, supra note 118, para. 8.
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intention to destroy a considerable number of individuals who are part of the group’.225 The
Trial Chambers in the Bagilishema and Semanza cases interpreted “in part” to mean “a
substantial part” of the group.226
The ICTY Appeals Chamber had the opportunity to address the issue of defining the part of
the group in the Krstic case. It confirmed that the intent requirement of genocide is “satisfied
where… the alleged perpetrator intended to destroy at least a substantial part of the protected
group.” It found a number of considerations that may be used while making the determination
of when the targeted part is substantial enough to meet this requirement:
The numeric size of the targeted part of the group is the necessary and important starting point, though not in all
cases the ending point of the inquiry. The number of individuals targeted should be evaluated not only in
absolute terms, but also in relation to the overall size of the entire group. In addition to the numeric size of the
targeted portion, its prominence within the group can be a useful consideration. If a specific part of the group is
emblematic of the overall group, or is essential to its survival, that may support a finding that the part qualifies as
substantial… 227
It seems established that the intent to destroy a protected group “in part”, the part must be a
substantial part of that group. There still remains the question of what is the population group,
the “whole”, from which a “substantial part” may be defined. In the context of Rwanda,
should the accused have intended to destroy the total Tutsi population of neighbourhood,
village,  town,  Rwanda  or  beyond?  In  general  terms,  the  relevance  of  this  consideration
increases in proportion to the perpetrator’s position in hierarchy of authority: the more limited
his or her sphere of control, the more limited the geographical area or total population group
that may be included in determining the appropriate threshold of scale.228 The issue was
addressed in Krstic, providing a useful reference to Rwanda in terms of a geographical
definition of the group targeted for destruction:
The historical examples of genocide also suggest that the area of the perpetrators’ activity and control, as well as
the possible extent of their reach, should be considered. Nazi Germany may have intended only to eliminate Jews
within Europe alone; that ambition probably did not extend, even at the height of its power, to an undertaking of
225 Kayishema and Ruzindana Judgement, para. 97.
226 Bagilishema Judgement, par. 64, Semanza Judgement, para. 316.
227 Prosecutor v. Krstic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-98-33-A, 19 April 2004 (Krstic Appeals
Chamber Judgement), para. 12.
228 Payam Akhavan, The Crime of Genocide in the ICTR Jurisprudence, Journal of International Criminal
Justice, Vol. 3, No. 4 (2005), p. 999.
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that enterprise on a global scale. Similarly, the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda did not seriously contemplate
the elimination of the Tutsi population beyond the country’s borders.23 The  intent  to  destroy  formed  by  a
perpetrator of genocide will always be limited by the opportunity presented to him. While this factor alone will
not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, it can - in combination with other factors - inform the
analysis.229
The ICTY Appeals Chamber acknowledged that the considerations it put forward are neither
exhaustive nor dispositive. They are only useful guidelines. The applicability of these factors,
as well as their relative weight, will vary depending on the circumstances of a particular case.
In other words, a court may make use of a wide margin of judicial appreciation and determine
whether the requirement is met or not on a case-by-case basis.
4.5.4 “As Such” – Question of Motive
In the last Chapter of this study the phrase “as such” is examined. The phrase has been under
intense debate since its adoption. During the drafting of the Genocide Convention some
delegates proposed that motive should be included in the definition of genocide. Others were
strongly opposed, fearing it to be dangerous and that it would enable those committing
genocide to claim that they had not committed the crime on grounds of motives listed. As a
compromise Venezuela, which favoured the United Kingdom proposal to delete the reference
to motive, proposed that the word “as such” should be introduced.230 Due to the ambiguity in
the drafting process, the question whether the words “as such” imply motive as a constituent
element of genocide cannot be answered by looking at the drafting history of Article II.231
There are divergent views on the meaning of “as such” in academic writings. On the one hand
it is rejected that motives had any relevance in criminal law. On the other hand the words “as
such” are seen as an expression of motive requirement in the definition, at least implicitly.
The position in most national criminal law systems is quite clear. In general motive is not an
element of an offence, but as evidence motive is always relevant as well as when the question
229 Krstic Appeals Chamber Judgement, para. 13.
230 For more information on the drafting process see Schabas, supra note 85, pp. 245-251.
231 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege and the Subject
Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (Intersentia: Antwerpen – Oxford – New York, 2002),
pp. 413-414.
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of punishment is in issue.232 Some scholars argue that the crime of genocide is a special case
and therefore acts against individuals should be motivated on grounds of hatred toward one of
the listed groups. According to Schabas, it seems unreasonable to dismiss entirely any role for
motive in the elements of the crime of genocide. He makes a distinction between the
collective motive and the individual motive. Genocide is, by nature, a collective crime,
committed with the cooperation of many participants: “The organizers and planners must
necessarily have a racist or discriminatory motive, that is, a genocidal motive, taken as a
whole. Where this is lacking, crime cannot be genocide.”233
When  the  Genocide  Convention  was  adopted,  political  groups  were  left  out  of  the
enumeration of the protected groups in the Convention. According to Jones, although political
groups were not included in the ambit of the Convention, if acts were aimed at a protected
group, but for political motives, they still may be characterised as acts of genocide as long as
the perpetrator’s intention was to destroy the protected group. Why the perpetrator intended to
do so is irrelevant to his guilt. Jones is of the opinion that the motives do not form part of the
elements of the crime of genocide. They may be taken into consideration by the tribunal as a
factual element in determining whether he had the intention to destroy the group, or in
sentencing.234
In the ICTR case law the phrase “as such” has been seen to reinforce the fact that the
individuals are chosen to be victimised due to their membership of a group. In Akayesu the
Trial  Chamber  held  that,  “the  act  must  have  been  committed  against  one  or  several
individuals, because such individual or individuals were members of a specific group, and
specifically because they belonged to this group”.235 The same interpretation was adopted by
different Trial Chambers of the ICTR in subsequent cases.236
In the Jelisic case the ICTY Appeal Chamber stressed the difference between specific intent
of genocide and motive stating that “The personal motive of the perpetrator of the crime of
genocide may be, for example, to obtain personal economic benefits, or political advantage or
232 Smith and Hogan, supra note 147, pp. 81-83.
233 Schabas, supra note 85, p. 254-255.
234 John R. W. D. Jones and Steven Powles, International Criminal Practice, (Transnational Publishers: Ardsley,
2003), p. 156.
235 Akayesu Judgement, para. 521.
236 See Nahimana et al., para. 948, Semanza Judgement, para. 312, Bagilishema Judgement, para. 61, Rutaganda
Judgement, para. 60 and Musema Judgement, paras. 153-154, 165.
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some form of power. The existence of a personal motive does not preclude the perpetrator
from also having the specific intent to commit genocide.”237
In the Niyitegeka case the Trial Chamber, concurring with Akayesu, interpreted “as such” to
mean that “the act must be committed against an individual because the individual was a
member of a specific group and specifically because he belonged to this group, so that the
victim is the group itself, not merely the individual”.238 This interpretation was challenged in
an appeal against the judgement. The appellant contended that the Trial Chamber had erred in
law by failing to interpret the words “as such” as meaning “solely”. The Trial Chamber’s
interpretation fails to give the words their full and true meaning and effect. In the appellant’s
view, the words “as such” should be interpreted as referring to a situation “where the specific
intent was to commit the specified acts against the group solely because they were members of
such a group”.239
The Appeals Chamber acknowledged that the words “as such” constitute an important
element of the crime and was deliberately included in the Genocide Convention in order to
reconcile the two diverging approaches in favour of and against including a motivational
component as an additional element of the crime. It went on to state that:
The term “as such” has the effet utile of drawing a clear distinction between mass murder and crimes in which
the perpetrator targets a specific group because of its nationality, race, ethnicity or religion.[] In other words, the
term “as such” clarifies the specific intent requirement. It does not prohibit a conviction for genocide in a case in
which the perpetrator was also driven by other motivations that are legally irrelevant in this context.240
The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber’s interpretation that acts have to be
committed against the victims because of their membership in the protected group, but this
need not to be the sole factor motivating the perpetrator. The perpetrator may also have other
motivations, namely personal motives, but they are considered legally irrelevant. In other
words, these personal motives do not preclude a conviction for genocide, if the perpetrator
had the specific intent to commit genocide.
237 Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. IT-95-10-A, 5 July 2001 (Jelisic Appeals
Chamber Judgement), para. 49.
238 Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Trial Judgement and Sentence, Case No. ICTR-96-14-T, 16 May 2003 (Niyitegeka
Judgement), para. 410.
239 Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Appeals Chamber Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-14-A, 9 July 2004 (Niyitegeka
Appeals Chamber Judgement), emphasis in Appellant’s Brief, para. 47.
240 Ibid., para. 53.
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The ICTR case law does not explicitly state whether or not the motives are part of the
elements of the crime of genocide, but it does reveal that victims have to be selected because
they are members of a protected group. The words “as such” have the function of clarifying
the specific intent requirement. The Appeals Chamber interpreted that the term gains its effet
utile through drawing a distinction between mass murder and crimes in which victims are
targeted with discriminatory intent. However, it should be noticed here that the discriminatory
intent, which is an element of the crime against humanity of persecution, is not enough for a
conviction  of  genocide.  The  perpetrator  has  to  seek  to  destroy  the  community  as  such.  The
phrase “as such” helps distinguish genocide from the crime against humanity of
persecution.241 Both crimes are “perpetrated against persons that belong to a particular group
and who are targeted because of such belonging”. But, in addition the discriminatory intent
required for persecution, genocide “must be accompanied by the intention to destroy… the
group to which the victims of the genocide belong”.242
4.5.5 Conclusion
Genocide is a crime that requires intent as a constitutive element of the crime. This intention
is called, inter alia, specific, special intent or dolus specialis in academic writing and the
ICTR case law. This element gives the crime of genocide its particular character among other
international crimes and separates it from the ordinary crime of murder, for example. The
gravity of the crime and its destructiveness attaches deep moral condemnation to it, and
therefore it has been labelled as “the crime of crimes”.
The ultimate victim of the crime of genocide is the targeted group, not merely the individual
who is victimised because of his or her membership of that group. The perpetrator seeks to
destroy the protected group. The definition of genocide is restricted to encompass acts that
amount to physical or biological genocide.
The phrase “in whole or in part” is interpreted to include quantitative criterion in the
definition, “in part” to mean at least “a substantial part” of the group. However, the ICTR case
241 Akhavan, supra note 228, p. 1003.
242 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic et al., Trial Judgement, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 January 2000, para. 636.
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law on the matter is not thorough, probably due to the nature of the conflict in Rwanda. In this
regard, the ICTY case law provides a more useful reference.
The position on the issue of motives and their relevance among the definition of genocide is
not settled. The perpetrator’s individual motives are, however, irrelevant, as long as he or she
had the specific intent to commit genocide. The phrase “as such” reinforces the fact that the
individuals must be singled out because of their membership of a group. It clarifies the
specific intent requirement for genocide and helps in distinguishing genocide from the crime
against humanity of persecution.
The problem in interpreting the definition of genocide, especially its mental element, at least
partly lies in the fact that the States negotiating the definition and the judges within the ad hoc
Tribunals understood the concepts of both “intent” and “motive” differently.243 A  court
interpreting the mental requirement has to balance between being faithful to the Genocide
Convention, but on, the other hand, and trying to find a workable intent standard suitable for
international prosecution of genocide. In this regard, there still remains work to be done by
subsequent international courts.
5 Concluding Remarks
The 1994 Genocide in Rwanda is a dark period in humanity, but unfortunately not an
exceptional event in the history of mankind. The genocide was implemented in such a way
that it had an immense impact on the population of Rwanda and left the country virtually in
ruins. The human suffering was measureless and continues to be a heavy burden on the
survivors.
Although no trial can bring to life those who died in the conflict, prosecution of perpetrators
may help in the gradual process of national reconciliation and maintenance of peace in the
region. The international community, even though it failed to prevent the genocide, was
determined  to  bring  to  justice  those  responsible  for  it.  The  creation  of  the ac hoc Tribunals
243 Boot, supra note 231, p. 416.
69
was another step in the path to end the culture of impunity that had earlier been the common
state of affairs.
The ICTR had, without dispute, a troubled start facing logistical and organisational problems,
but even so it became a fully operational and efficient court capable of conducting fair trials
and creating important jurisprudence. It has delivered a wealth of judgements elucidating the
legal ingredients of genocide and other international crimes alike. Even though one cannot yet
make a definitive assessment of the work of the ICTR, it may be said that the ICTR has made
a significant contribution to the law of genocide and international criminal justice in general.
For international lawyers it has become a commonplace to refer to the case law of the ad hoc
Tribunals. The corpus of procedural and substantive law developed by the ICTR and the
ICTY constitutes a basis for subsequent trials in international and hybrid tribunals. In
addition, national jurisdictions might consider the jurisprudence on substantive law useful
while prosecuting international crimes.
